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be advantaged and disadvantaged on account of race. It denies that there is 
such a thing called race privilege that materially impacts people’s worlds. 
Moreover, this Article suggests that at least part of the reason why class-based 
affirmative action has been embraced by those who oppose race-based 
affirmative action is precisely because it denies that race matters, has 
mattered, and probably will continue to matter unless we make conscious 
efforts to make race matter less. 
The Article proceeds in two Parts. Part I locates class-based affirmative 
action doctrinally. Specifically, this Part identifies class-based affirmative 
action as the heir of the “suspect class” to “suspect classification” shift—a 
shift that tells its own lie about race. The substance of this lie is that those who 
exist at the top of racial hierarchies are as vulnerable to denigration, 
stigmatization, and subordination on account of race as are those who exist at 
the bottom of racial hierarchies. Part II goes on to demonstrate that class-
based affirmative action suffers from the same infirmities from which race-
based affirmative action is charged to suffer. It argues that the reason why 
proponents of class-based affirmative action are sanguine about these 
infirmities when they are present in class-based programs, but loathe them 
when they are present in race-based programs, is because their opposition to 
race-based affirmative action is not due to these infirmities. Rather, it is due to 
their disdain of the work that race-based affirmative action performs. That is, 
race-based programs function to assert, loudly, that race still matters and does 
so in powerful ways. Many proponents of class-based affirmative action resist 
this function. 
Moreover, class-based affirmative action functions to assert that we, as a 
society, have entered a post-racial future. That is, class-based affirmative 
action tells a lie about the insignificance of race. Many proponents of class-
based programs likely find these programs attractive and comforting for that 
very reason. The importance of this Article is that it uncovers the narrative 
work that class-based affirmative action performs, and it argues that those 
who are interested in racial justice ought to resist these programs because of 
their dangerous discursive effects. 
INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Schuette v. 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and 
Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN),1 upholding an 
amendment to the Michigan state constitution that prohibited “all sex- and 
race-based preferences in public education, public employment, and public 
contracting,”2 Richard Kahlenberg, one of the most prolific proponents of 
 
1 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
2 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26; Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638 (holding that nothing in the 
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class-based affirmative action, published an editorial with the New York 
Times.3 In the piece, Kahlenberg, writing with co-author Halley Potter, 
attempts to assure those who are interested in seeing racial minorities attend 
institutions at which they would be grossly underrepresented absent race-
conscious admissions programs that Schuette did not mean that all hope was 
lost.4 The authors explain that, post-Schuette, racial minorities will not 
necessarily disappear from elite universities, which are finding it more and 
more difficult to implement race-based affirmative action.5 Quite the contrary. 
They suggest that the only thing that these schools need to do in order to 
maintain the numbers of racial minorities enrolled there is to grant preferences 
in admissions to those from socioeconomically challenged backgrounds.6 
Class-based affirmative action, they argue, could function (and, in several 
jurisdictions that have experimented with it, has already functioned) to 
facilitate racial minorities’ admission to schools that they would otherwise be 
unable to access.7 Further, they write, class-based affirmative action could 
actually be better than race-based affirmative action at ensuring that racial 
minorities are represented at these universities: 
If a socioeconomic plan is designed well, it can even achieve greater 
levels of minority representation than a race-only program. A class-based 
admissions program at the University of Colorado Boulder that considers 
multiple socioeconomic and academic factors increased admit rates for 
not only low-income students but also underrepresented minorities, as 
compared to race-only affirmative action.8 
Yet, despite Kahlenberg and Potter’s assurances, this Article argues that 
class-based affirmative action is not the saving grace to all of those who want 
to increase the enrollment of racial minorities at institutions from which they 
have been excluded historically (and from which they are presently 
underrepresented). Many people who want to see racial minorities at these 
institutions of higher learning are not interested in getting them there by hook 
or by crook. Rather, we are interested in racial justice. And pursuant to our 
thick understanding of racial justice, it is not enough that racial minorities 
merely are present at schools from which they have been excluded. Equally if 
 
United States Constitution, or in the Court’s precedents, allow “the Judiciary to set aside 
Michigan laws that commit this policy determination to the voters”). 
3 Richard D. Kahlenberg & Halley Potter, Class-Based Affirmative Action Works, N.Y. 
TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Apr. 27, 2014, 7:01 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
roomfordebate/2014/04/27/should-affirmative-action-be-based-on-income/class-based-
affirmative-action-works [http://perma.cc/LSB4-69LY].  
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
8 Id.  
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not more important are the stories that we tell about why they are there. And 
class-based affirmative action tells a wholly unfulfilling story about why racial 
minorities are, and ought to be, at these institutions. 
This Article argues that class-based affirmative action denies the continuing 
relevance of race. This, of course, explains why it is popular among those who 
contend that the nation is, finally, post-race. Post-racialism can be described as 
the sense that race simply does not matter as much as it mattered in the past.9 
According to the ideology of post-racialism, if the telos of the nation is one 
where racial differences, if they exist, are completely irrelevant to social, 
cultural, and political life, then we are almost there. It contends that we are 
closer to that halcyon racial destination than we are to our horrific racial 
origins, where race over-determined individuals’ lives and did so in frequently 
brutal ways.10 Post-racialism refuses to recognize our current proximity to that 
historical past. It argues instead that, today, racism is an aberration, a rarity.11 
It posits that enduring racial inequality is not the effect of race or racism, but 
rather is the effect of other forces, like class or individual behavior.12 And it 
posits that given the insignificance of race, institutional actors act culpably, 
even immorally, when they make race significant in their decision-making 
processes.13 
Class-based affirmative action is consistent with post-racialism’s ideology 
of racial progress. It denies that race is a significant feature of American life. 
Class-based affirmative action denies that individuals—and groups—continue 
to be advantaged and disadvantaged on account of race. It denies that there is 
such a thing called race privilege that materially impacts people’s worlds. 
Moreover, this Article suggests that at least part of the reason why class-based 
affirmative action has been embraced by those who oppose race-based 
affirmative action is precisely because it denies that race matters, has mattered, 
 
9 See Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal 
Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 968 (2010). 
10 See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1601 (2009) (observing that 
post-racialism contends that the nation has “transcended racial divisions of past 
generations”).  
11 See Barnes et al., supra note 9, at 968 (“[P]ost-racialism is a set of beliefs that coalesce 
to posit that racial discrimination is rare and aberrant behavior as evidenced by America’s 
and Americans’ pronounced racial progress.”). 
12 See Cho, supra note 10, at 1602 (“Theoretical post-racialists reject race-based 
remedies because they believe that such remedies obscure a more fundamental problem, 
typically one of class-based injuries.”). 
13 See Barnes et al., supra note 9 at 975 (“If society is post-racial, then race-based 
remedies are undesirable as a lingering remnant of less enlightened times. Affirmative 
action programs or other race-conscious remedies are, by definition, inconsistent with a 
post-racial ‘reality.’” (emphasis added)).  
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and probably will continue to matter unless we make conscious efforts to make 
race matter less. 
This Article proceeds in two Parts. Part I locates class-based affirmative 
action doctrinally. Specifically, this Part identifies class-based affirmative 
action as the heir of the “suspect class” to “suspect classification” shift—a shift 
that tells its own lies about race. To explain, race-based affirmative action 
programs necessarily contain a racial classification, and, since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,14 the Court has 
reviewed all laws that contain racial classifications with strict scrutiny—even 
those laws that are designed to benefit historically disadvantaged racial 
groups.15 Thus, instead of using strict scrutiny to protect suspect classes from 
discrimination, the Court now uses strict scrutiny when reviewing laws that 
contain suspect classifications.16 Race, of course, is the paradigmatic suspect 
classification. The result is that state efforts to remedy racial stratification, 
when they explicitly mention race, are constitutionally suspicious; since 
Adarand, courts are required to be predisposed to striking them down. Class-
based affirmative action avoids this problem by not mentioning race—by not 
containing a racial classification. In this way, it avoids analysis under strict 
scrutiny, and its constitutionality is more secure.17 Yet, it tells the problematic 
story described above about the irrelevance of race—although it is true that 
this country’s history of racial disenfranchisement has enduring effects. 
Part II then conducts a critique of class-based affirmative action. This Part 
demonstrates that it suffers from the same infirmities from which race-based 
affirmative action is charged to suffer. It argues that the reason why proponents 
of class-based affirmative action are sanguine about these infirmities when 
they are present in class-based programs, but loathe them when they are 
present in race-based programs, is because their opposition to race-based 
affirmative action is not due to these infirmities. Rather, it is due to their 
disdain of the work that race-based affirmative action performs. That is, race-
based programs function to assert, loudly, that race still matters and does so in 
powerful ways. Many proponents of class-based affirmative action resist this 
function. Moreover, class-based affirmative action functions to assert that we, 
as a society, have entered a post-racial future. That is, class-based affirmative 
action also tells a lie about the insignificance of race. Many proponents of 
 
14 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
15 See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (explaining that the implication of City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), the doctrinal predecessor to Adarand, 
was that the potential for racial discrimination against whites was of sufficient concern to 
render all racial classifications subject to heightened scrutiny). 
16 See infra notes 40-58 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (asserting that because the Supreme 
Court has never found income-based classifications to be suspect, they are not subject to 
strict scrutiny and thus are more likely to be held constitutional). 
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class-based programs likely find them attractive and comforting for that very 
reason. The importance of this Article is that it uncovers the narrative work 
that class-based affirmative action performs, and it argues that those who are 
interested in racial justice ought to resist these programs because of their 
dangerous discursive effects. 
Before beginning the exploration, it bears noting an infirmity from which 
class-based affirmative action suffers that is not shared by race-conscious 
programs—a lack of candor. That is, if schools use class-based affirmative 
action as a vehicle for admitting racial minorities who would not be admitted 
otherwise, then those schools are involved in a project of mystification. Several 
Justices have articulated their discomfort with class-based affirmative action 
programs when they are instituted as indirect attempts to address minority 
enrollment levels. In Gratz v. Bollinger,18 the Court struck down the University 
of Michigan’s race-conscious admissions program, which attempted to enroll 
more students from historically disadvantaged racial groups by giving those 
students, by virtue of their status as a racial minority, a fifth of the points 
necessary to guarantee admission.19 In dissent, Justice Souter noted his 
disquietude with programs that attempt to address racial issues with non-racial 
means.20 As an example of such a program, he looked to admissions programs 
like Texas’s “Ten Percent Plan” that achieve a racially diverse student body by 
guaranteeing admission to all top-ranked students from each high school in the 
state.21 Because high schools in Texas are racially segregated—a consequence 
of racial segregation in housing—many of the top students guaranteed 
admission to Texas’s public colleges are racial minorities.22 Justice Souter 
writes: 
While there is nothing unconstitutional about such a practice, it 
nonetheless suffers from a serious disadvantage. It is the disadvantage of 
deliberate obfuscation. The ‘percentage plans’ are just as race conscious 
as the point scheme (and fairly so), but they get their racially diverse 
results without saying directly what they are doing or why they are doing 
it. In contrast, Michigan states its purpose directly and, if this were a 
 
18 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
19 Id. at 275 (holding that the university’s policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve its 
compelling interest in diversity and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
20 See id. at 297-98 (Souter, J., dissenting) (contending that the “percentage plans” used 
by other universities suffer from the “serious disadvantage . . . of deliberate obfuscation”). 
21 Id. at 297 (citing California, Florida, and Texas as examples of states that have 
initiated programs guaranteeing admissions to the top percentage of students in each public 
high school). 
22 See Richard Rothstein, The Colorblind Bind, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, July-Aug. 
2014, at 71 (“Because so many Texas African Americans attend predominantly black 
schools (in predominantly low-income neighborhoods), the plan generated a 2003 freshman 
class that was 4.5 percent black.”). 
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doubtful case for me, I would be tempted to give Michigan an extra point 
of its own for its frankness. Equal protection cannot become an exercise 
in which the winners are the ones who hide the ball.23 
Justice Ginsburg has seconded Souter’s objection, most recently in her 
dissent in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.24 The Court was called upon 
to review the constitutionality of the explicitly race-conscious portion of 
Texas’s Ten Percent Plan—an addendum to the plan that the University of 
Texas made25 after the Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger26 suggested that 
explicitly race-conscious admissions programs could satisfy the demands of 
the Equal Protection Clause when done right.27 Disagreeing with the 
characterization of the Ten Percent Plan as a “race-neutral” alternative to 
explicitly race-conscious programs, Justice Ginsburg wrote, “I have said before 
and reiterate here that only an ostrich could regard the supposedly neutral 
alternatives as race unconscious.”28 
The lack of candor that class-based affirmative action programs embody is 
an obvious, but serious, deficiency. Institutions of higher learning ought to be 
open about their intentions to enroll students from historically disadvantaged 
racial groups. Those honest, frank declarations of intent are also honest, frank 
declarations of the continuing significance of race. They are declarations that 
the society that we inhabit is far from a post-racial one. It is one where our life 
chances—including our chances of gaining admission to an elite institution of 
higher learning—are heavily influenced by race. We should encourage these 
declarations. This is a point to which the Conclusion will return. 
I. 
Historically speaking, interest in class-conscious admissions programs 
seems to arise whenever it appears that race-conscious admissions programs 
will become impossible to implement—either because it seems that the Court 
will strike down race-based programs as violating the Equal Protection Clause 
as a matter of course, or because a jurisdiction has prohibited such programs as 
a matter of state law.29 Thus, in the years following Regents of the University 
 
23 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 297-98 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
24 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
25 Id. at 2416 (explaining that the university returned to using an explicitly race-
conscious admissions program in 2004). 
26 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
27 Id. at 334 (“Universities can . . . consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a ‘plus’ 
factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant.”). 
28 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
29 Justice Kennedy, for one, conceptualizes the move toward class-based (or otherwise 
non-race-based) avenues as a means to remedy the race-salient problem of the 
underrepresentation of racial minorities in academic classes to be an intended and desired 
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of California v. Bakke,30 when a majority of the Court refused to declare the 
constitutionality of race-based affirmative action and when the legality of such 
programs hung by the delicate thread that was Justice Powell’s lone opinion,31 
there was a spate of calls for class-based affirmative action.32 Calls for class-
conscious programs got more numerous and strident in the 1990s: that decade 
witnessed not only the passage of Proposition 209 in California, which 
prohibited the consideration of race in university admissions in the state,33 but 
also the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hopwood v. Texas,34 which declared that 
Powell’s opinion in Bakke was not binding and that the Constitution forbade 
race-conscious admissions programs.35 Similarly, interest in class-conscious 
programs multiplied after Fisher was decided, and it appeared that, while the 
Court was willing to declare that race-conscious programs could in theory be 
constitutional, jurisdictions might find it impossible to construct an actual 
program that would pass strict scrutiny.36 And once again, in the wake of 
 
eventuality—and not a guileful effort to duck the requirements of the Constitution. See 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Were the courts to apply a searching 
standard to race-based admissions schemes, that would force educational institutions to 
seriously explore race-neutral alternatives.”). 
30 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
31 See id. at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.) (holding that race may be considered as a “plus” 
factor in admissions policies as long as “it does not insulate the individual from comparison 
with all other candidates”); id. at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(holding, on behalf of three other Justices, that states may take race into account to remedy 
the disadvantages of past discrimination); id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (holding, on behalf of three other Justices, that the race-based admissions 
policy violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
32 See Chapin Cimino, Comment, Class-Based Preferences in Affirmative Action 
Programs After Miller v. Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option, or Subterfuge?, 64 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1289, 1293 (1997).  
33 See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a) (“The State shall not discriminate against, or grant 
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, 
or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public 
contracting.”). 
34 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
35 Id. at 945 (indicating that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke garnered no support from 
the rest of the Court, and holding that “the use of race in admissions for diversity in higher 
education contradicts . . . the aims of equal protection”); see Ben Gose, The Chorus Grows 
Louder for Class-Based Affirmative Action, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 25, 2005, Special 
Supp. at 5 (“Broad interest in class-based affirmative action arose in the 1990s as a strategy 
to help identify an overlapping pool of minority students when affirmative action based on 
race came under legal attack.”); Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based 
Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472, 472 n.1 (1997) (noting that interest in class-
based affirmative action increased subsequent to the passage of Proposition 209 and the 
Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Hopwood v. Texas). 
36 See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, The Court’s Denial of Racial Societal Debt, 40 HUM. 
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Schuette and the Court’s upholding of Michigan’s ban on race-consciousness 
in university admissions, we have seen attention turn toward class-based 
affirmative action.37 
This history reveals why class-based affirmative action is attractive to some 
supporters of race-based affirmative action: it is a more tenable legal avenue 
than race-based affirmative action. Moreover, it is important to be clear about 
why it is a more tenable legal avenue than race-based affirmative action: the 
Court has never found that classifications on the basis of income are suspect. 
Yet, the Court has found, since Adarand, that all racial classifications are 
suspect. Because supporters of heightened scrutiny for laws that burden the 
poor lost their hard-fought battle in the 1960s and ‘70s,38 it raises no 
constitutional eyebrows for admissions offices to consciously consider the 
socioeconomic status of the applicant when making admissions decisions.39 
This Part explores the jurisprudence. 
 
RTS. no. 1, 2013, at 12, 14 (“Fisher seems to preserve the shell of Grutter—race 
consciousness is fine so long as [the University] jumps through fiery hoop after fiery hoop 
to prove that race is in fact an appropriate factor to be taken into account. In effect, however, 
the Court has aggressively narrowed the space in which state actors can pursue a policy that 
addresses racial inclusion.”). 
37 See Should Affirmative Action Be Based on Income?, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE 
(Apr. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/04/27/should-affirmative-
action-be-based-on-income [http://perma.cc/3HB7-4NKE]. 
38 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 20-21 (1969) (arguing that the Court ought to 
find that the poor are a “suspect class” and, consequently, use strict scrutiny to review laws 
that burden them). 
39 Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1037, 1064 
(1996) [hereinafter Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action] (“[C]lass-based 
preferences are often described by members of the Supreme Court as a clearly constitutional 
alternative to racial preferences.”); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Getting Beyond Racial 
Preferences: The Class-Based Compromise, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 721, 725 (1996) (“Because 
the left lost the great effort to get ‘class’ categorized as suspect under Equal Protection 
jurisprudence, there is no double-edged sword with which conservatives can strike down 
benefits for the poor.” (footnote omitted)). 
 It bears noting that there are questions as to whether class-based affirmative action is 
actually constitutionally “safer” than race-based affirmative action. Since Washington v. 
Davis, the Court has stated that a facially neutral law that disparately impacts a racial group 
should only be found to contain a racial classification (and therefore be reviewed with strict 
scrutiny) if challengers can establish that the legislators who enacted the law did so with a 
“discriminatory purpose.” 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). As clarified in Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the “discriminatory purpose” test is “more than 
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the      
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 
‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” 442 
U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citation omitted). It is hoped that class-based affirmative action, 
 
  
64 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:55 
 
A. The “Suspect Class” to “Suspect Classification” Shift 
With respect to the Court’s race jurisprudence, the “suspect class” to 
“suspect classification” shift is one that has been studiously explored in the 
literature.40 The story begins with the Court’s finding that those who have not 
historically enjoyed racial privilege in this country—racial minorities—needed 
to be protected from laws that perpetuated their lack of privilege and 
subordinated status.41 The Court’s primary mechanism of protection was to 
require that laws that discriminated against racial minorities pass strict 
scrutiny.42 A law that burdened racial minorities would be found to comport 
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that no State “deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”43 only if the law was 
motivated by a compelling governmental interest and was narrowly tailored to 
promote that interest.44 Thus, racial minorities (paradigmatically, black people) 
 
which is facially race-neutral, will disproportionately impact people of color and, therefore, 
have a disparate impact. Cimino, supra note 32, at 1290-91 (“By encouraging the use of 
race-neutral alternatives to what is primarily a race-based problem, the [Supreme] Court 
seems to imply that the government can do covertly what it cannot do overtly.”). The 
question then becomes: will decisionmakers have enacted the facially race-neutral programs 
or laws with a discriminatory purpose, i.e., with the intent to increase the number of racial 
minorities who attend the institution? Will they have pursued a class-conscious admissions 
policy that disparately impacts white and Asian applicants “because of,” not merely “in spite 
of,” its adverse effects upon white and Asian applicants? If decisionmakers pursued the 
class-based program because race-based programs were constitutionally vulnerable, and if 
they pursued the class-based program in order to achieve the same end as a race-based 
program without using suspect means, then the answer may be yes. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, 
The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 
2348 (2000). Consequently, these programs might “trigger the same strict, and usually fatal, 
scrutiny applicable to admission policies that rely on racial classifications.” Id. at 2348. 
40 See, e.g., Darren L. Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race:” The 
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 615, 638-40 (2003); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 465 (1997); 
Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (2013). 
41 See Rubenfeld, supra note 40, at 465 (“When laws explicitly imposed burdens on 
certain ‘suspect classes’ of persons, the Court held, the suspicion that something 
constitutionally forbidden was afoot justified more stringent scrutiny. Which classes of 
persons were ‘suspect’ in this way? One characteristic repeatedly held necessary to make a 
class ‘suspect’ was a ‘history of purposeful’ discrimination.”). 
42 See id. (“At this point in the doctrine’s development, strict scrutiny made sense. For 
when a state singles out a class of persons that has been subject to widespread, invidious 
prejudice and denies to members of this class rights or liberties that others enjoy, there is 
excellent reason to fear that the government has acted deliberately to reduce these persons to 
a second-class legal status.”). 
43 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
44 Rubenfeld, supra note 40, at 433 n.29. 
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became a suspect class.45 As a suspect class, laws that burdened them would be 
subject to strict scrutiny.46 The corollary to that proposition is that laws that 
benefited them, as well as laws that burdened racial groups that were not racial 
minorities, would not be subject to strict scrutiny.47 
The “suspect class” to “suspect classification” shift, which was proposed 
initially in Justice Powell’s lone opinion in Bakke as a technique for protecting 
white people from harms that affirmative action programs may visit upon 
them,48 first enjoyed a majority of the Court’s assent in Croson.49 In Croson, 
the Court struck down a program implemented by the city of Richmond that 
required general contractors who had contracts with the city to subcontract 
thirty percent of the contract’s value to a minority-owned business.50 The 
program was designed to remedy the fact that racial minorities received only 
0.67% of city contracting dollars in a city in which black people were the 
majority racial group.51 The Court subjected the law to strict scrutiny, although 
the law is comfortably and reasonably described as one that benefited racial 
minorities—a benign law.52 
Importantly, the Court’s use of strict scrutiny was not the product of an 
articulated concern that, although the law seemed to benefit racial minorities, it 
might actually function to perpetuate their subordinated status (which was the 
avowed danger against which strict scrutiny was supposed to guard). Instead, 
the Court’s use of strict scrutiny was a product of an articulated concern that, 
 
45 See Reginald C. Oh, A Critical Linguistic Analysis of Equal Protection Doctrine: Are 
Whites a Suspect Class?, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 583, 586 (2004) (“The term 
‘suspect class,’ therefore, refers to a historically situated social group that has been 
disadvantaged and invidiously discriminated against in the political process. When the Court 
talks about suspect classes . . . it is referring to social groups, like racial minorities . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)). 
46 See id. (explaining that a law is subject to a heightened level of review if the law can 
be shown to disadvantage a suspect class). 
47 See Rubenfeld, supra note 40, at 465.  
48 See Siegel, supra note 40, at 39 (“In Bakke, Justice Powell took thirteen pages to 
confront the argument that strict scrutiny ‘should be reserved for classifications that 
disadvantage “discrete and insular minorities”’ in the Carolene Products sense.”).  
49 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Oh, supra note 45, at 601. 
50 Croson, 488 U.S. at 511. 
51 Id. at 479-80. 
52 Some of the Justices who signed on to the majority opinion striking down the law 
voiced their concerns that the law actually did not benefit minorities inasmuch as the law 
constructed minorities as incapable of succeeding on their own merits and, consequently, 
were inherently or in practice inferior. See id. at 517 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“‘[E]ven 
though it is not the actual predicate for this legislation, a statute of this kind inevitably is 
perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who are granted this special 
preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their race.’” 
(quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
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although the law benefitted racial minorities, it had the effect of burdening 
white people.53 That is, the Court was concerned about racial discrimination 
against white people.54 Thus, in holding that strict scrutiny was also 
appropriate for benign laws, the decision declared that the danger that white 
people also could be victims of racial discrimination was real enough that 
heightened review was apt and necessary. Indeed, the decision declared that 
the constitutional problem was not so much the passage of laws that harmed 
racial minorities; instead, the constitutional problem was the passage of laws 
that mentioned race.55 Accordingly, racial minorities were no longer a suspect 
class. Instead, race was a suspect classification. Thus, the Court effected the 
class-to-classification shift.56 After some waffling on the question of the 
 
53 Id. at 474 (plurality opinion) (“[A]lthough the Plan unquestionably disadvantages 
some white contractors who are guilty of past discrimination against blacks, it also punishes 
some who discriminated only before it was forbidden by law and some who have never 
discriminated against anyone.”). 
54 See Siegel, supra note 40, at 30-31 (“The earliest arguments for applying strict 
scrutiny to ‘all classifications’ are concerned about harms to whites. Early affirmative action 
opinions argue for strict scrutiny of affirmative action as protecting ‘whites’ in ways the 
Court’s opinions no longer do today, when the Court explains the purpose of review in 
collective and universal, rather than group-conscious, terms.” (footnote omitted)). The Court 
in Croson articulated other concerns that the use of racial classifications raised—including 
fears that racial classifications would have to be used in perpetuity, that they fomented racial 
violence and race hatred, and that they were immoral and, therefore, illegal. See, e.g., 
Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that discrimination on the basis of 
race is “illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic 
society” (citation omitted)).  
55 Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (“[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause 
is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.” 
(citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1989) (plurality opinion))). 
56 Some have argued that the class-to-classification shift is illegitimate because it makes 
irrelevant the famous footnote four in Carolene Products, in which Justice Stone said that 
heightened scrutiny should be reserved for laws that infringe on fundamental rights, restrict 
political processes, or (most relevant to this Article) reflect “prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities.” United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
Some have argued that, according to this footnote, heightened review should not be applied 
to laws that burden white people and other groups with racial privilege because such laws 
do not reflect “prejudice” and are not directed at discrete and insular “minorities.” See, e.g., 
Hutchinson, supra note 40, at 639 (“The application of heightened scrutiny to white 
plaintiffs is impossible to justify under the Carolene Products formulation. Whites are not a 
politically vulnerable class by any serious theory of political power.” (footnote omitted)). 
 Interestingly, Justice Scalia made a riposte to this argument in his concurrence in Schuette 
v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for 
Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). He attempted to 
impeach the persuasiveness of the argument first by noting that the footnote was dictum in 
an opinion that was only joined by three other Justices. See id. at 1644 (Scalia, J., 
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appropriate level of scrutiny for laws that benefit racial minorities,57 the Court 
established the class-to-classification shift as the law of the land in Adarand.58 
B. The Effects of the Class-to-Classification Shift 
For those interested in racial justice, the class-to-classification shift is 
disturbing for many reasons. First, the shift makes it extremely difficult for 
governments to attempt to remedy the enduring subordination of racial 
minorities through race-conscious measures. Indeed, this is one of the 
calculated effects of the class-to-classification shift and the Court’s subjection 
of all explicit considerations of race to strict scrutiny. In Croson, Justice 
O’Connor suggested that the race-salient issue that the city of Richmond 
attempted to confront with its race-conscious law—the spectacular 
underrepresentation of racial minorities in the lucrative construction industry—
need not go unaddressed subsequent to the Court striking down the law as 
unconstitutional.59 Instead, the city could attempt to address its race-salient 
issue with race-neutral means.60 She wrote:  
Simplification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding requirements, 
and training and financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races 
would open the public contracting market to all those who have suffered 
the effects of past societal discrimination or neglect. . . . [They] would 
serve to increase the opportunities available to minority business without 
classifying individuals on the basis of race.61 
 
concurring). Moreover, he noted what others have observed about footnote four: it is not 
obvious that a minority group’s discreteness and insularity are political liabilities. Id. at 
1645. Indeed, these characteristics may make such groups more powerful politically. See 
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-24 (1985) 
(“Other things being equal, ‘discreteness and insularity’ will normally be a source of 
enormous bargaining advantage, not disadvantage, for a group engaged in pluralist 
American politics.”). Of course, if discrete and insular minority groups possess political 
power, then there is no need for the judiciary to protect them with heightened scrutiny, thus 
rendering footnote four off-base and rightfully ignored.  
57 See Metro Broad. Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny to 
uphold a law that granted preferences to minorities in the dispensing of broadcast licenses), 
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
58 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“Accordingly, we hold 
today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”). 
59 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (“Nor is local government powerless to deal with 
individual instances of racially motivated refusals to employ minority contractors.”). 
60 See id.  
61 Id. at 509-10. 
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 Indeed, subsequent to the class-to-classification shift, using paths of race-
neutrality to solve race problems like the one existing in Croson is the most 
viable avenue open to governments. 
By the time that Grutter was decided in 2003, the effect that the use of strict 
scrutiny had in compelling governments to attempt to achieve racial ends with 
race-neutral means had become explicitly part of the standard. Indeed, the 
Court in Grutter stated that, in order to pass strict scrutiny, governments that 
wanted to implement race-conscious laws had to show “serious, good faith 
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives” and evidence that those 
race-neutral efforts would fail or had failed.62 Thus, in Parents Involved, 
Justice Kennedy became the fifth vote to strike down the race-conscious school 
assignment plans implemented by school districts in Seattle and St. Louis—
despite his refusal to concede that the Constitution required race neutrality at 
all times63—because of his sense that the school districts had not really 
contemplated the use of race-neutral means to solve the race problem that was 
massive racial segregation in their schools.64 Justice Kennedy suggested to the 
school boards whose integration plans he had just voted to strike down, and to 
other school boards facing similar predicaments, that they could achieve the 
racial end of “bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races” 
through race-neutral means such as “strategic site selection of new schools; 
drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of 
neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students 
and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and 
other statistics by race.”65 Again, using paths of race-neutrality to solve race 
problems like the ones existing in Seattle in St. Louis is the most viable avenue 
open to governments subsequent to the class-to-classification shift. 
To be clear, class-based affirmative action ought to be understood as 
exemplary—indeed, it is a manifestation par excellence—of what happens 
when the Court denies governments interested in addressing the continued 
subordination of racial minorities the ability to directly confront the racial 
issues that they seek to confront. Incapable of seeking to achieve the result of 
increasing the enrollment of racial minorities in institutions of higher learning 
by simply increasing the numbers of racial minorities admitted to institutions 
 
62 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003). 
63 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788 
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
64 See id. at 789 (“Each respondent has asserted that its assignment of individual students 
by race is permissible because there is no other way to avoid racial isolation in the school 
districts. Yet, as explained, each has failed to provide the support necessary for that 
proposition.”). Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, disputed Justice Kennedy’s contention that 
the school boards had not contemplated the race-neutral means that he suggested could 
solve the race problem the school boards faced. Id. at 851-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
65 Id. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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of higher learning, governments now have to attempt to achieve that same 
racial end through the race-neutral means of class-based affirmative action. As 
such, class-based affirmative action may be understood as a kind of ruse, an 
elision, and an elaborate distraction from the continuing fact of disadvantages 
experienced on account of race. 
C. Lies about Race that the Class-to-Classification Shift Tells 
The class-to-classification shift is also disturbing because of the work that it 
does to declare that those with racial privilege are similarly situated to those 
without such privilege. The shift declares that there is no disparity in power 
and privilege between the races. Indeed, it declares that there is actually 
symmetry between whiteness and nonwhiteness. Accordingly, white people are 
just as likely to be burdened by the use of race in law—and are as likely to be 
burdened in the same way by the use of race in law—as are non-white people. 
In treating burdens on white people as constitutionally equivalent to burdens 
on non-white people, the Court denies the fact that some burdens reinforce and 
reiterate racial subordination, while others do not. As Crenshaw describes the 
issue, the class-to-classification shift declares that the “constitutional injury [in 
Brown v. Board of Education] was not what the state was doing with racial 
classifications—namely racially subordinating black children as second-class 
citizens—but the fact that they were using racial classifications to do it. . . . 
Thus, Linda Brown, who had to walk over train tracks to the inferior black 
school, and the white children in the superior school were harmed in the same 
way as Linda walked by.”66 
If a racial symmetry exists between white people and non-white people, then 
it would be fair to describe our society as one in which racism has ended; it 
would be fair to say that we have entered a post-racial utopia where race no 
longer matters.67 And if racism is over and race no longer matters, then racial 
classifications in law must be presumptively illegitimate because they cannot, 
by definition, be efforts to address present racism and the enduring effects of 
historical racism. Moreover, if racial classifications are not addressing present 
racism and the enduring effects of historical racism, then what are they doing? 
If, in the absence of racism and the relevance of race, a racial classification 
burdens one race and benefits another, then the latter must be receiving an ill-
gotten advantage while the former must be the victim of an undeserved 
disadvantage. Differently stated, if racism is over, then the races are operating 
on an even playing field. Accordingly, to the extent that a law burdens 
members of one race and benefits members of another, then it is the law that is 
 
66 Crenshaw, supra note 36, at 13. 
67 See Oh, supra note 45, at 602 (“Moreover, the elimination of suspect class analysis 
suggests that the Court believes that racial minorities are no longer suspect classes deserving 
of special protection from the political process. Rather, the implication is that now, in the 
post-civil rights era, all racial groups stand on equal footing in the political process . . .”). 
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disrupting the levelness of the playing field. The law can only produce such a 
disruption illegitimately. 
In this way, we can understand why those Justices who are presumptively 
opposed to all racial classifications in law characterize them as giving “special 
rights” or “special protection”—as opposed to equal rights or equal 
protection—to racial minorities.68 Race-conscious policies such as affirmative 
action can only be understood as efforts to provide “equal” rights or “equal” 
protection to racial minorities if one assumes that the playing field on which 
the races are operating is unequal; accordingly, race-conscious measures would 
be efforts to correct the disadvantages that make it difficult for racial 
minorities to achieve at the same level as white people. However, if the playing 
field is already level, then race-conscious policies give something “special”—
and illicit—to their beneficiaries.69 
Accordingly, there is something prematurely celebratory about the class-to-
classification shift. It celebrates society’s triumph over racism before society 
has actually triumphed over racism. It celebrates the insignificance of race 
before race has actually become insignificant. 
There is another aspect of the class-to-classification shift that deserves 
mention: the story that the class-to-classification shift tells is one in which 
racism has been largely conquered and race has been made into an 
inconsequential fact of the body because of law. The class-to-classification 
shift suggests that racism has been defeated for the most part because the 
Constitution has been interpreted, and other laws have been passed, to produce 
that very result. 
 
68 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 218 (1979) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the affirmative action plan in question was unlawful because it 
violated Title VII’s prohibition of employers discriminating against some employees by 
giving preferential treatment to others). 
69 It is worth noting, however, that black people were accused of seeking “special rights” 
even before the Supreme Court held that they were a class worthy of heightened protection. 
In this way, “special rights” discourse is not tethered to black people’s status as a suspect 
class, but rather is detached from the actual level of legal protection that is afforded to them. 
To explain, black people were described as asking for something “special” by seeking civil 
rights protections in the years closely following their emergence from slavery—a time when 
no laws protected them and discrimination against them was a banal feature of American 
life. When invalidating a federal law that provided civil rights protections to newly 
emancipated former slaves, the Supreme Court wrote, just eighteen years after the formal 
end to the institution of chattel slavery in the United States:  
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has 
shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the 
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the 
special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be 
protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected.  
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (emphasis added). 
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Consider the majority opinion in Croson. Five Justices were willing to 
declare that there was nothing constitutionally repugnant about a jurisdiction in 
which minorities had been effectively shut out of a lucrative industry.70 
Instead, the Court announced that it would only feel that something was amiss, 
indeed suspect, about the racial geography of Richmond and its construction 
industry if there was hard evidence that racial discrimination had produced that 
geography.71 Moreover, the Court embraced a narrow definition of “racial 
discrimination.” Racial discrimination was not defined as the city’s embrace of 
policies and procedures that it knew were without utility but functioned to 
preclude racial minorities from entering and participating in the construction 
industry.72 Instead, the Court defined racial discrimination as the “bad actor 
acting badly:”73 the racist legislator who passes a law or implements a rule that 
 
70 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 529 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the majority disregarded Richmond’s history of discrimination as 
well as statistics suggesting that minority businesses had been shut out of the construction 
market). 
71 See id. at 510 (majority opinion). 
72 See id. (detailing several policies that functioned to exclude the entrance of new, 
smaller businesses into the Richmond construction industry and observing that “[m]any of 
the formal barriers to new entrants may be the product of bureaucratic inertia more than 
actual necessity, and may have a disproportionate effect on the opportunities open to new 
minority firms”).  
 Note as well that if racial discrimination was understood to include the continued use of 
ineffective, bureaucratic tools that functioned to exclude racial minorities (especially when 
the exclusionary effect of those tools are known to the institutions that use them), then racial 
discrimination might be found in law schools’ continued use of the LSAT in making 
admissions decisions. It is well-known both that the LSAT does not accurately predict future 
performance in law school or legal careers and that racial minorities underperform on the 
test. Anthony Peirson Xavier Bothwell, The Law School Admission Test Scandal: Problems 
of Bias and Conflicts of Interest, 27 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 3 (2001). Indeed, this fact 
formed part of Justice Thomas’s discontent with the University of Michigan Law School’s 
race-conscious admissions program in Grutter:  
[N]o modern law school can claim ignorance of the poor performance of blacks, 
relatively speaking, on the Law School Admission Test (LSAT). Nevertheless, law 
schools continue to use the test and then attempt to “correct” for black 
underperformance by using racial discrimination in admissions so as to obtain their 
aesthetic student body. The Law School’s continued adherence to measures it knows 
produce racially skewed results is not entitled to deference by this Court. The Law 
School itself admits that the test is imperfect, as it must, given that it regularly admits 
students who score at or below 150 (the national median) on the test. . . . And the Law 
School’s amici cannot seem to agree on the fundamental question whether the test itself 
is useful. 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 369-70 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted).  
73 Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination 
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1053 (1978) 
 
  
72 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:55 
 
formally precludes racial minorities from receiving city contracting dollars; the 
prejudiced city employee who rejects the lowest bid because it was submitted 
by a qualified minority-owned firm and accepts a higher bid submitted by a 
white-owned firm; the bigoted union member who refuses to allow racial 
minorities to join the union; the biased prime contractor who simply refuses to 
hire minority subcontractors.74 
It was significant to the Court that any private actor responsible for 
perpetrating bad acts in the private sector would have been subject to the city’s 
local antidiscrimination laws.75 Wrote the Court, “Since 1975 the city of 
Richmond has had an ordinance on the books prohibiting both discrimination 
in the award of public contracts and employment discrimination by public 
contractors. The city points to no evidence that its prime contractors have been 
violating the ordinance in either their employment or subcontracting 
practices.”76 The Court took the absence of any litigation under the ordinance 
as good evidence that there had been no racial discrimination in Richmond 
since the mid-1970s.77 Moreover, in terms of bad actors acting in the public 
sector, the Court could not have been oblivious to the fact that any actor 
perpetrating bad acts in the public sector would have not only run afoul of the 
city’s antidiscrimination law but also of the Equal Protection Clause.78 Indeed, 
they would have been perpetrating the precise kind of racial discrimination that 
the Court has interpreted the Clause as distinctly prohibiting.79 
Accordingly, if the Court limits its definition of racial discrimination to 
discrete acts of intentional racism, and if the Equal Protection Clause and other 
antidiscrimination laws are perfectly capable of addressing this type of racial 
discrimination, then it is entirely reasonable to conclude that the reason why 
the Court could not find any evidence of racial discrimination in Richmond 
 
(“The perpetrator perspective sees racial discrimination not as conditions, but as actions, or 
series of actions, inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator. The focus is more on what 
particular perpetrators have done or are doing to some victims than it is on the overall life 
situation of the victim class.”). 
74 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 502 (stating the assumption that “white prime contractors 
simply will not hire minority firms” was “unsupported”); id. at 510 (“[Richmond] points to 
no evidence that qualified minority contractors have been passed over for city contracts or 
subcontracts, either as a group or in any individual case.”). 
75 See id. at 502 n.3. 
76 Id. (citation omitted). 
77 Id. (concluding that the “complete silence of the record concerning enforcement of the 
city’s own antidiscrimination ordinance” is evidence that the construction industry is not 
one that has unfairly (read: illegally) excluded racial minorities). 
78 See id. at 494 (stating that state legislatures have “many legislative weapons at their 
disposal both to punish and prevent present discrimination”). 
79 See id. at 509 (arguing that if the city could find evidence of minority exclusion, the 
city could take action because the Equal Protection Clause attempts to prohibit such 
exclusion). 
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was because the Equal Protection Clause and other antidiscrimination laws had 
effectively rid the city of racial discrimination.80 
The Court’s logic in Croson is important, and it is worth schematizing 
clearly: the elimination of de jure discrimination and the use of law to prohibit 
acts of discrimination by private and public actors meant to the Court that most 
discrimination—at least, most discrimination that the Court was willing to 
cognize as discrimination—had been defeated.81 The fact of the defeat of 
discrimination by law justified the increased skepticism of law. In the case of 
the Equal Protection Clause, the increased skepticism of law took the form of 
the Court being as solicitous of laws that burdened white people as it is of laws 
that burdened racial minorities.82 Moreover, that the Court would be equally 
solicitous of laws that burdened white people makes sense if racism is pretty 
much over and we have entered an era of post-racialism: as noted above,83 if 
most discrimination has been defeated, which the Court assumes is true when 
de jure discrimination has been eliminated and the law prohibits acts of 
discrimination by private and public actors, then most laws that benefit racial 
minorities while burdening non-minorities cannot, by definition, be efforts to 
remedy discrimination. If discrimination has been effectively eliminated, then 
the playing field is, on the whole, level. Accordingly, any benefit given to 
 
80 See generally Freeman, supra note 73, at 1054 (stating that those who adhere to the 
perpetrator perspective view “racial discrimination not as a social phenomenon, but merely 
as the misguided conduct of particular actors. It is a world where, but for the conduct of 
these misguided ones, the system of equality of opportunity would work to provide a 
distribution of the good things in life without racial disparities . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  
 Of course, if racial discrimination is defined more broadly, and if institutional practices 
that have racially exclusionary effects are also understood to constitute racial discrimination, 
then one can see that the Equal Protection Clause and other antidiscrimination laws had 
worked to eliminate only one kind of racial discrimination, i.e., the egregious, spectacular, 
obvious racial discrimination that was the form that racial exclusion tended to take from the 
dawn of the nation to the 1960s. See William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in 
America Today: An Introduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 3 (2011-2012) (“[Traditional racism is] the 
complex of social practices and legal constraints known as Jim Crow. It is these that modern 
equal protection doctrine has condemned.” (footnote omitted)). Enduring and untouched by 
the narrow interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and many antidiscrimination 
statutes is structural racism. See id. at 5-6 (“Though the nation moved slowly away from Jim 
Crow, the structur[al racism] endured, as powerful as ever, even if no longer deliberately 
racist.”). 
81 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 502 (finding that because discrimination had been explicitly 
outlawed, there presumptively was no discrimination occurring). 
82 See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 36, at 14 (“Rather than conceptualizing racialized 
obstacles as inherently suspect, the Court has instead painted efforts to eliminate such 
barriers as suspect.”). 
83 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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racial minorities is an illicit one that unjustly burdens non-minorities.84 Hence, 
the Court’s equal skepticism of laws that burden non-minorities. 
The Court’s recent decision in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder85 
buttresses the above claim: the Court believes that racism is an aberration and 
race has been made into an inconsequential fact of the body because of law 
and, as a result, this justifies the increased skepticism of law. In the case of 
Shelby County, the increased skepticism of law took the form of the Court 
being as suspicious of a law that was designed to protect racial minorities’ 
voting rights as it would have been suspicious of a law that was designed to 
burden racial minorities’ voting rights.86 In Shelby, a majority of the Court 
voted to strike down section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), which 
Justice Ginsburg describes as “one of the most consequential, efficacious, and 
amply justified exercises of federal legislative power in our Nation’s 
history.”87 The VRA was passed to realize the promises of the Fifteenth 
Amendment by addressing rampant racial discrimination in voting.88 Section 
 
84 The Court contends that the only benefits given to racial minorities that do not unjustly 
burden non-minorities are those that are given after the jurisdiction has met evidentiary 
conditions that may be impossible to meet—“extreme” conditions that may have been 
possible to meet only prior to the civil rights revolution in the 1960s. The Court says: 
If the city of Richmond had evidence before it that nonminority contractors were 
systematically excluding minority businesses from subcontracting opportunities, it 
could take action to end the discriminatory exclusion. Where there is a significant 
statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors willing and 
able to perform a particular service and the number of such contractors actually 
engaged by the locality or the locality’s prime contractors, an inference of 
discriminatory exclusion could arise.  
 Croson, 488 U.S. at 509. Only under those “extreme” circumstances—and not under the 
equally extreme circumstances that described the city of Richmond, wherein minorities 
represented less than one percent of those in a lucrative industry while comprising more 
than fifty percent of the total population—could a jurisdiction attempt to remedy the racial 
exclusion with race-conscious measures:  
Under such circumstances, the city could act to dismantle the closed business system 
by taking appropriate measures against those who discriminate on the basis of race or 
other illegitimate criteria. In the extreme case, some form of narrowly tailored racial 
preference might be necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
85 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
86 Id. at 2628-29 (finding that the Voting Rights Act needed recalibrating because it had 
done its job in creating parity between white and black voter turnout). 
87 Id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
88 Id. at 2618 (majority opinion) (writing that the Voting Rights Act was passed to 
“address entrenched racial discrimination in voting, ‘an insidious and pervasive evil which 
had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious 
defiance of the Constitution’” (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 
(1966))). 
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4(b) of the VRA contained the formula that determined which jurisdictions 
(“covered jurisdictions”) would have to get preclearance by the Attorney 
General or a panel of three judges for any changes to their voting laws.89 
Covered jurisdictions were those that had a documented history of racial 
discrimination in voting.90 At the time of the initial passage of section 4(b), 
these covered jurisdictions had deplorable statistics that clearly demonstrated 
the pervasiveness of racial discrimination in voting.91 The Court found that 
“[s]hortly before enactment of the Voting Rights Act, only 19.4 percent of 
African-Americans of voting age were registered to vote in Alabama, only 31.8 
percent in Louisiana, and only 6.4 percent in Mississippi. Those figures were 
roughly 50 percentage points or more below the figures for whites.”92 
However, things had changed in the five decades that had elapsed since the 
Act’s passage: the statistics that the covered jurisdictions now boast tell a story 
in which racial discrimination in voting had declined significantly.93 Moreover, 
“[b]latantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority 
candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.”94 The Court held that this was 
reason enough to strike down the formula for determining which jurisdictions 
were covered, as those jurisdictions had been targeted for federal oversight due 
to a lamentable history that no longer described their present.95 
 
89 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(b), Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (1965) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C.  § 1973(b) (2006)), invalidated by Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. 2612. 
90 See Shelby, 133 S. Ct. at 2619 (explaining that “covered jurisdictions” were those 
“States or political subdivisions that had maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to 
voting as of November 1, 1964, and had less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in 
the 1964 Presidential election”). 
91 Id. at 2618. 
92 Id. at 2624-25 (citation omitted). 
93 See id. at 2618-19 (“By 2009, ‘the racial gap in voter registration and turnout [was] 
lower in the States originally covered by § 5 than it [was] nationwide.’ Since that time, 
Census Bureau data indicate that African-American voter turnout has come to exceed white 
voter turnout in five of the six States originally covered by § 5 . . . .” (quoting Nw. Austin 
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203-04 (2009))).  
94 Id. at 2616 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 202). Furthermore, the Court thought it 
significant that, pursuant to the preclearance requirements, the Attorney General objected to 
current proposed changes significantly less often than he or she did when the Act was 
initially enacted. See id. at 2626 (“In the first decade after enactment of § 5, the Attorney 
General objected to 14.2 percent of proposed voting changes. In the last decade before 
reenactment, the Attorney General objected to a mere 0.16 percent.” (citation omitted)).  
95 See id. at 2631 (“Congress could have updated the coverage formula at that time, but 
did not do so. Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare § 4(b) 
unconstitutional. The formula in that section can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting 
jurisdictions to preclearance. . . . Our country has changed, and while any racial 
discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to 
remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.”). 
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The Court’s reasoning is problematic inasmuch as the absence of racial 
discrimination in voting in covered jurisdictions may be due to the fact that 
they are subject to federal oversight.96 Moreover, the removal of federal 
oversight that is the consequence of striking down section 4(b) may result in 
jurisdictions implementing discriminatory changes in voting laws and, 
consequently, developing statistics documenting racial inequality in voting that 
rival those extant at the dawn of the VRA.97 However, this is not the 
immediate focus. Instead, the interest here is on why the Court believed that 
things had changed between the passage of the VRA and the present. The 
answer: the law did it. The Court is clear on this point: 
There is no doubt that these improvements are in large part because of the 
Voting Rights Act. The Act has proved immensely successful at 
redressing racial discrimination and integrating the voting process. . . . 
Problems remain in these States and others, but there is no denying that, 
due to the Voting Rights Act, our Nation has made great strides.98 
The Court’s logic in Shelby is fascinating. The law has achieved great 
successes in eliminating racial discrimination. Moreover, because the law has 
achieved great success, the Court thinks it appropriate to recalculate the costs 
and benefits of the law. In the case of the VRA, one of the costs of the law was 
the fact that principles of federalism were necessarily offended by it.99 Yet, in 
1964, these costs were outweighed by the law’s benefits: eradicating racism 
and racist practices from the franchise.100 However, when Shelby was decided 
 
96 Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 713, 725 (2014) (“The Court rejected the argument that the improvements on the 
ground could be attributable to Section 5’s deterrent effect, which justified continuation of 
the law . . . .”). 
97 See id. at 744 (arguing that the majority of the Shelby Court disregarded “a record 
which demonstrates continued racial discrimination in voting in covered jurisdictions” and 
that “race discrimination in voting remained a real problem, at least in some of the 
jurisdictions” (footnote omitted)). 
98 Shelby, 133 S. Ct. at 2626 (citations omitted); see also id. at 2628 (indicating that in 
the fifty years that had passed since the enactment of the VRA, “voting tests were abolished, 
disparities in voter registration and turnout due to race were erased, and African-Americans 
attained political office in record numbers” and arguing that these changes occurred “largely 
because of the Voting Rights Act”).  
99 See id. at 2624 (stating that the VRA “authorizes federal intrusion into sensitive areas 
of state and local policymaking,” that it “represents an ‘extraordinary departure from the 
traditional course of relations between the States and the Federal Government,’” and that it 
“constitutes ‘extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system’” (citations 
omitted)). 
100 See id. at 2618 (“The Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary measures to 
address an extraordinary problem. . . . This was strong medicine, but Congress determined it 
was needed to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting . . . .”). 
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in 2013—when the flagrant practices that facilitated minority exclusion in the 
pre-Civil Rights era had been largely eradicated—the benefits of the continued 
use of the law were modest.101 Most importantly, they were dwarfed by the 
undiminished federalism costs of the law.102 That the costs of the law 
outweighed the benefits justified striking down the law in Shelby. 
Notice the parallels between the Court’s logic in Shelby and the Court’s 
logic in Croson. In both, the elimination of de jure discrimination and the use 
of law to prohibit private and public acts of discrimination meant to the Court 
that most discrimination had been defeated. The fact of the defeat of 
discrimination by law justified the Court increasing its skepticism of law. In the 
case of Croson and the Equal Protection Clause, the increased skepticism of 
law took the form of the Court being as solicitous of laws that burdened whites 
as it is of laws that burdened racial minorities. In the case of Shelby and the 
VRA, the increased skepticism of law took the form of the Court striking down 
the engine behind one of the VRA’s most foundational sections. 
The lesson of Croson, Shelby, and the Court’s race jurisprudence generally 
is that the Court is comfortable declaring the elimination of a particular, 
historically specific type of discrimination as the elimination of discrimination 
in its entirety. When there is no evidence of de jure discrimination and no 
evidence of private and public actors consciously excluding a racial group, 
then the Court believes that the war against racism has been won. Importantly, 
what goes unidentified as discrimination is discrimination in forms that deviate 
from historical antecedents. Structural exclusions, unconscious biases, 
institutional inertia, intentions to disadvantage cleverly camouflaged by 
seemingly legitimate motives—all of these more modern iterations of racial 
discrimination go uncognizable as racial discrimination. Instead, in the 
vanquishing of antiquated forms of racism, the Court sees society’s entrance 
into a post-racial future. 
*** 
This Part has explained how we have arrived at a constitutional present 
where class-based affirmative action is a more tenable legal avenue than race-
based affirmative action in achieving the admission of racial minorities into 
educational institutions from which they have been excluded historically. 
However, many commentators have argued that, independent of the fact that 
class-based affirmative action raises fewer constitutional questions than race-
based affirmative action, the former is superior to the latter. The next Part 
disputes this contention. It demonstrates that class-based affirmative action is 
as conceptually and pragmatically flawed as race-based affirmative action. 
 
101 See id. at 2619 (stating that “[t]he question is whether the Act’s extraordinary 
measures . . . continue to satisfy constitutional requirements” and holding that they do not). 
102 See id. at 2626. 
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Moreover, it argues that the reason why class-based programs enjoy the level 
of support that they do is because class-based affirmative action does not make 
the claims that race-based affirmative action makes. The latter declares, 
stridently, that race matters, racial inequality endures, and society is obliged to 
do something about it. Class-based affirmative action makes no such 
declaration. 
II. 
The beginning of the previous Part showed how interest in class-based 
affirmative action inevitably skyrockets upon the advent of laws that threaten 
the legality of race-based affirmative action. Thus, in the wake of Bakke, 
interest in class-conscious admissions programs waxed. Subsequent to the 
Fifth Circuit’s Hopwood decision holding that the federal Constitution 
prohibited race-based affirmative action, interest in class-conscious admissions 
programs increased—and it surged even higher after the passage of Proposition 
209 in California, which prohibited race-consciousness in university 
admissions in the state. After the Court’s decision in Fisher v. Texas, in which 
the Court intimated that it may never encounter a race-based affirmative action 
program that it believes passes constitutional muster, interest in class-
conscious programs swelled. And, yet again, after the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of an amendment to Michigan’s constitution that prohibited 
the consideration of race in university admissions in Schuette, interest in class-
conscious programs has grown again. 103 
Because of the direct relationship between the demonstrated vulnerability of 
race-conscious programs and the interest in class-conscious ones, it is not at all 
unreasonable to conclude that, for some supporters of race-conscious 
admissions programs, class-based affirmative action is a surrogate for race-
based affirmative action.104 As the “next best thing,” class-conscious programs 
are a way to accomplish the goals pursued by race-conscious programs—the 
admission of racial minorities to institutions from which they have been 
historically excluded and to which they would not gain admission pursuant to 
traditional indicia of merit—without having to use the “dirty” word of race. 
In this way, class-based affirmative action is a way for those who disagree 
about the propriety of race-based affirmative action to “get to yes.” Supporters 
of race-based programs may support class-based programs because they will 
achieve the admission of racial minorities to more selective colleges and 
universities, and opponents of race-based programs will be content inasmuch 
 
103 See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text. 
104 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 1913, 1914 (1996) (stating that one group of supporters of class-based 
affirmative action views such programs “as a partial, second-best surrogate for race-based 
affirmative action in a legal and political climate in which race-based affirmative action may 
no longer be feasible”).  
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as they will have achieved the goal of preventing admissions offices from 
consciously considering the race of applicants.105 
Some argue that we ought not to conceptualize class-based affirmative 
action as “the next best thing” or a “compromise” at all. They argue that, even 
if the legality of race-based programs is clearly established and is in no way 
threatened, institutions ought to implement class-based programs because they 
are actually superior to race-based programs. That is, they argue that class-
based programs are second to none—they are the best thing.106 
Richard Kahlenberg, who has been described as “the nation’s chief 
proponent of class-based affirmative action in higher education admissions,”107 
has championed such programs, frequently and vigorously, for nearly two 
decades.108 His chief argument is that race-conscious admissions programs are 
deeply flawed because they have the effect of admitting racial minorities who 
are not disadvantaged in any real way.109 He notes that racial minorities 
admitted pursuant to such programs do not tend to be poor, but instead 
frequently have some degree of class privilege.110 Moreover, they tend not to 
 
105 See Tung Yin, A Carbolic Smoke Ball for the Nineties: Class-Based Affirmative 
Action, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 213, 215 (1997) (reviewing RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE 
REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996)) (“Supporters of race-based 
affirmative action may see class-based affirmative action as a second-best alternative . . . . 
Opponents of race-based affirmative action may view class-based affirmative action as an 
acceptable compromise.”). 
106 See Fallon, supra note 104, at 1915 (explaining that some view “economically based 
affirmative action as attractive for reasons independent of the arguments supporting race-
based affirmative action” because such programs “respond[] directly to ‘burdens that have 
been unfairly placed in . . . individual’s [sic] paths’” (quoting Clarence Thomas, Affirmative 
Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough Enough!, 5 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
402, 410-11 (1987))). 
107 Ronald Roach, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Battle Over Race-Conscious 
Approaches Pushes Idea to the Surface, DIVERSE ISSUES HIGHER EDUC. (June 19, 2003), 
http://diverseeducation.com/article/3029/ [http:// http://perma.cc/CPB5-RV6B]. 
108 See, e.g., Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 39. 
109 RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POTTER, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: STATE 
UNIVERSITIES THAT CREATED ALTERNATIVES TO RACIAL PREFERENCES 2 (2012) (claiming 
that “racial preferences avoid the hard work of addressing deeply rooted inequalities” 
related to class). 
110 Id. at 5 (“[R]esearch from strong supporters of affirmative action . . . found that 86 
percent of African Americans at selective colleges were either middle or upper class.”); see 
also Antonin Scalia, Commentary, The Disease as Cure: “In Order To Get Beyond Racism, 
We Must First Take Account of Race”, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 153-54 (articulating his 
opposition to race-conscious admissions programs because he is “not willing to prefer the 
son of a prosperous and well-educated black doctor or lawyer—solely because of his race—
to the son of a recent refugee from Eastern Europe who is working as a manual laborer to 
get his family ahead”). 
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be black American, but rather black immigrants,111 who are not thought to be 
disadvantaged in the way that black people born in the United States are 
disadvantaged.112 Beyond his fundamental argument that the wrong people are 
benefitting from race-based programs, he also claims that class-based 
affirmative action does not raise the same moral questions as do race-based 
programs.113 For Kahlenberg and likeminded observers, the consideration of 
race in admissions may very well be immoral; the consideration of class, on 
the other hand, does not present similar moral dilemmas.114 
On closer examination, however, class-based affirmative action suffers from 
the same infirmities from which race-based affirmative action allegedly 
suffers. The next Section demonstrates this fact. 
A. The Shared Infirmities of Race-Based and Class-Based Affirmative Action 
1. Meritocracy Perversion 
Race-based affirmative action is often accused of perverting systems of 
meritocracy.115 Some argue that when, pursuant to race-conscious admissions 
programs, a racial minority gets admitted to an institution with a GPA and 
standardized test scores lower than others who were rejected, the institution 
 
111 See KAHLENBERG & POTTER, supra note 109, at 5 (“At Ivy League institutions, 41 
percent of black freshmen in one study were immigrants, a group that is more 
socioeconomically advantaged than non-immigrant blacks. At Harvard College, the New 
York Times reported in 2004, the majority of black undergraduates ‘perhaps as many as two-
thirds [] were West Indian and African immigrants or their children . . . .’” (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Sara Rimer & Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More Blacks, But 
Which Ones?, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004, at A1)). 
112 Douglas S. Massey et al., Black Immigrants and Black Natives Attending Selective 
Colleges and Universities in the United States, 113 AM. J. EDUC. 243, 246 (2007) (“On 
socioeconomic indicators such as education, income, and residential segregation, black 
immigrants generally fare better than African Americans.”). 
113 KAHLENBERG & POTTER, supra note 109, at 19 (discussing the “significant moral . . . 
costs” involved with “using race in deciding who gets ahead in society”).  
114 Id. (“It is entirely reasonable, given the moral costs associated with using race, to 
conclude that if universities can achieve racial diversity without racial preferences, then that 
is the preferred course to take.”); see also Fallon, supra note 104, at 1923 (“To date, 
virtually no one has argued that preferences based on economic disadvantage are inherently 
morally unjust.”); Gose, supra note 35 (stating that some critics of race-based affirmative 
action find such programs “morally objectionable”). 
115 Yin, supra note 105, at 248 (“One of the strongest arguments against race-based 
affirmative action is that it is subversive to the notion of a meritocracy.”); Jared M. Mellott, 
Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Employment After Grutter: The Case 
for Containment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1091, 1140 (2006) (“In a country that prides 
itself on being a meritocracy without official ranks of nobility attached at birth, affirmative 
action seems especially perverse.”). 
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has compromised its merit-based system.116 Indeed, it has admitted an 
unmeritorious, or not quite as meritorious, person.117 
Bracketing the compelling arguments made by critical race theorists that 
traditional indicia of merit are not race-neutral (or class-neutral, or gender-
neutral, or enjoy any form of neutrality at all) and thus only privilege one kind 
of race-specific merit over other kinds,118 class-based affirmative action 
similarly perverts systems of meritocracy. That is, any admissions program 
that allows for the admission of those who would not have been admitted but 
for the changes in admissions criteria heralded by the program can be accused 
of perverting systems of meritocracy. To the extent that class-based affirmative 
action programs would admit students who would not have been admitted 
otherwise, it, too, should be understood as forcing institutions to “lower their 
standards”—that is, to compromise their merit-based system.119 Yin has quite 
clearly made this argument: 
Assuming that one believes in the ability of test scores and high school 
grades to predict college performance—and those who argue that [race-
based] affirmative action results in the admission of the less qualified do 
. . . class-based affirmative action simply lowers standards for a different 
group of applicants: the poor rather than minorities.120 
2. Inefficacy 
Race-based affirmative action is sometimes accused of being incapable of 
remedying the problem that its authors intend it to address. At least part of 
 
116 See Yin, supra note 105, at 248. 
117 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 110, at 149 (“There is a whole range of ability—from 
unqualified, through minimally qualified, qualified, well-qualified, to outstanding. If I can’t 
get Leontyne Price to sing a concert I have scheduled, I may have to settle for Erma Glatt. 
La Glatt has a pretty good voice, but not as good as Price . . . . Any system that coerces me 
to hire her in preference to Price, because of her race, degrades the quality of my         
product . . . .”). 
118 See, e.g., Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED 
THE MOVEMENT at xiii, xxix (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (“[C]ertain conceptions 
of merit function not as a neutral basis for distributing resources and opportunity, but rather 
as a repository of hidden, race-specific preferences for those who have the power to 
determine the meaning and consequences of ‘merit.’”). 
119 See Yin, supra note 105, at 249 (observing the irony that results when opponents of 
race-based affirmative action support a class-based “program that is equally subversive to a 
meritocracy as racial preferences”). 
120 Id. at 250. Moreover, Yin notes the possibility that that which is odious to opponents 
of race-conscious admissions programs—the construction of different admissions “tracks” 
for students who possess the salient characteristic—may also be a feature of class-conscious 
admissions programs. Id. at 249 (“Like racial preferences . . . class-based affirmative action 
creates two tracks for admissions, one for ‘standard’ admissions and one for the ‘poor.’”). 
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Justice Thomas’s objection to race-based affirmative action, as articulated in 
his dissent in Grutter, is his sense that the admission of a few racial minorities 
to elite institutions like the University of Michigan Law School every year is 
not going to solve the crisis that is racial stratification in the United States.121 
He writes that race-conscious programs “will never address the real problems 
facing ‘underrepresented minorities,’”122 and he charges that the architects of 
such programs only care about their “own image[s] among know-it-all elites, 
not solving real problems like the crisis of black male underperformance.”123 
Essentially, Justice Thomas can be heard to argue that race-based affirmative 
action can not and will not accomplish the job that it is designed to do: make 
race matter less (or make race have different meanings) in future iterations of 
society by giving presently disempowered racial minorities access to elite 
institutions and the opportunities, power, and privilege that come with such 
access.124 
However, class-based affirmative action suffers from the same infirmity. If 
these programs are designed to reduce the size of the gaping chasm in the 
United States between the wealthy and the poor by helping the poor through 
removing some of the barriers that they have in accessing elite institutions,125 
then there ought to be skepticism about the efficacy of class-based affirmative 
action as well.126 Professor Malamud has argued that class-based affirmative 
 
121 See Khiara M. Bridges, Race Matters: Why Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas (and 
the Rest of the Bench) Believe that Affirmative Action is Constitutional, 24 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 607, 645 (2015).  
122 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 372 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
123 Id. at 372-73 n.11.  
124 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, 
Academic Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1769 (2004) 
(“Affirmative action is needed to create a leadership class for a diverse American         
future . . . .”). 
125 See Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 1847, 1849 (1996) (discussing “the redistributive task of class-based 
affirmative action”). 
126 It should be noted that one does not need to define the goals of class-based 
affirmative action in structural terms—that is, in terms of reducing the gap between the 
“haves” and the “have-nots.” Stated differently, one does not have to imagine that class-
based affirmative action is concerned with reordering society. One can imagine, rather, that 
it is simply concerned with individuals. As such, one can articulate the goals of class-
conscious programs as removing some of the barriers that individual poor people face in 
accessing elite institutions and the opportunities, power, and privilege that come with such 
access. If this is the goal of class-based affirmative action, then it is wildly successful every 
time that it allows a poor person to attend a school that he or she would not have been 
“qualified” to attend pursuant to traditional indicia of merit. 
 However, just as one can define the goals of class-based affirmative action with an eye 
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action is unlikely to result in the large-scale restructuring of society in terms of 
reducing income inequality, nor will it produce something that we could call 
“economic justice.”127 Instead, she notes that “[c]lass-based affirmative action 
is likely to do its work by redistributing economic opportunities among 
individuals who stand relatively close together in the gradational hierarchy—it 
offers opportunities to the strongest of the ‘have-nots’ at the expense of the 
weakest of the ‘haves.’”128 She writes that such programs will only produce 
“[s]light differences in relative economic position” and will likely “generate all 
the more resentment as a result.”129 
3.  Resentment 
The third infirmity of race-based affirmative action relates to resentment. 
One charge that is frequently levied against race-based affirmative action is 
that it will stoke the fires of race hatred and racial tribalism. For example, in 
her dissent in Metro Broadcasting, Justice O’Connor voted to strike down a 
federal affirmative action program that gave preferences to racial minorities in 
the granting of broadcasting licenses in part because of her fear that racial 
classifications in law “endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of a 
Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial 
hostility and conflict.”130 Class-based affirmative action is supposed to be 
superior to race-based programs because it will not similarly generate racial 
tensions.131 
However, that hope may be specious. In light of the well-documented, and 
fairly obvious, fact that class-based affirmative action is intended to act as a 
 
towards something that we can call individual justice, and away from something that we can 
call social justice, we can define the goals of race-based affirmative action in similar ways. 
Accordingly, if race-based programs are not intended to make race matter less in future 
iterations of society, but rather are intended to remove some of the barriers that individual 
racial minorities face in accessing elite institutions, then such programs are wildly 
successful every time that they allow a racial minority to attend a school that he or she 
would not have been “qualified” to attend pursuant to traditional indicia of merit. 
127 Malamud, supra note 125, at 1865 (“Legal decisionmakers designing programs of 
class-based affirmative action will most likely be drawn to the gradational approach.”).  
128 Id. 
129 Id.  
130 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
131 See, e.g., KAHLENBERG & POTTER, supra note 109, at 19 (arguing that “economic 
affirmative action programs can address . . . discrimination indirectly, without conflicting 
with . . . public perceptions of fairness”); Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal 
Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 666 (2011) (“Students receiving such preferences are 
much less likely to be stigmatized . . . . There is much less likely to be group self-
segregation or the nourishment of group resentment, which sometimes happens with strictly 
race-based preferences.”). 
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surrogate for race-based affirmative action,132 it will not take much for most to 
realize that class-based programs are doing the work of race-based programs. It 
will not take much for most to realize that class-based affirmative action may 
just be a (failed) euphemism for race-based affirmative action. The sense that 
class-based programs are just race-based programs dressed in sheep’s clothing 
will likely be heightened by the fact that, since racial minorities are 
disproportionately represented among the poor, class-based programs will 
likely have the effect of disproportionately benefitting racial minorities.133 The 
result is that we should expect that class-based programs would still generate 
many of the same racial tensions that race-based programs are accused of 
generating. As Kim Forde-Mazrui has described, class-based affirmative 
action’s “overall disparate impact in favor of minorities may still stoke 
resentment among whites who perceive such programs as racial favoritism by 
proxy.”134 
4.  Denial of Individuality 
Some opponents of race-conscious admissions programs argue that these 
programs deny the individuality of applicants seeking admission to institutions 
of higher learning.135 They insist that when admissions offices know and 
consider the race of persons submitting applications, the consideration thereof 
renders invisible and irrelevant all of the applicant’s other characteristics that 
make him or her an individual—like grades, scores on standardized tests, 
 
132 See supra notes 104-05, and accompanying text. 
133 Sander, supra note 35, at 475-76 (discussing “the theory that socioeconomic 
preferences will disparately favor racial minorities (particularly blacks and Latinos)”).  
However, the presumption that class preferences will disproportionately benefit racial 
minorities may not be true. This is because, while poor white people are unprivileged by 
virtue of class, poor black and Latino people are unprivileged by virtue of class and race. 
See, e.g., Nikole Hannah-Jones, Class Action: A Challenge to the Idea that Income Can 
Integrate America’s Campuses, PROPUBLICA (June 24, 2013, 12:46 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/class-action-a-challenge-to-the-idea-that-income-can-
integrate-americas-cam [http://perma.cc/Q76M-29TE]. Therefore, a poor white applicant 
will enjoy advantages that a poor black or Latino applicant will not. Those advantages, 
which may translate into higher standardized test scores, may make the poor white applicant 
more attractive to institutions implementing a class-based affirmative action program. See 
id. (“Some studies have shown that a college admissions system that favors the poor would 
indeed boost enrollment of working-class students—making them as much as 40 percent of 
the student body—but it would sink black and Latino enrollment. Representation of blacks 
and Latinos in college could fall from its current 16 percent into the single digits.”). 
134 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 39, at 2377.  
135 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945-46 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[Race-based 
admissions] treats minorities as a group, rather than as individuals. . . . The assumption is 
that a certain individual possesses characteristics by virtue of being a member of a certain 
racial group.”), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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special talents, the ability to speak multiple languages, and adversities 
overcome.136 In effect, many opponents of race-conscious admissions 
programs contend that the application process successfully allows applicants to 
present themselves as individuals, and it successfully allows those who read 
the applications to know the applicants as individuals. The consideration of 
race defeats this feat of individuation, transforming the applicants into 
deindividuated persons to be admitted, waitlisted, or rejected outright on the 
basis of one overriding trait: race. 
Thus, when admissions offices claim that they need to be conscious of race 
in order to admit a class of students who have a multiplicity of perspectives 
and viewpoints, critics of race-based affirmative action counter that these 
offices are impermissibly equating race with viewpoint.137 This is a racial 
stereotype, they say.138 It is a generalization about race. So generalized, raced 
persons are denied their individuality.139 Class-based affirmative action is not 
 
136 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273-74 (2003) (“Thus, the result of the 
automatic distribution of 20 points [for race] is that the University would never consider 
student A’s individual background, experiences, and characteristics . . . .” (citing Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978))); Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. 
Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University of Texas: An Opportunity for the Supreme Court 
to Overturn its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 437, 485 (2011) (“By 
labeling students as either ‘Hispanic’ or ‘African-American’ and according preferences in 
relation to these broad group identities, the law school in Grutter rejects the individuality of 
its students.”). 
137 See, e.g., Thompson & Schiff, supra note 136, at 470 (stating that Grutter “assumes 
that increasing racial diversity will increase viewpoint diversity” and arguing that this 
assumption treats “people according to race on account of outmoded or unsubstantiated 
stereotypes about what members of certain races think or believe”); Stamenia Tzouganatos, 
Case Comment, Law School’s Race-Conscious Admissions Policy Survives Equal 
Protection Analysis, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005) (“By allowing the Law School 
to target specific racial and ethnic groups in promoting a student body with diverse 
perspectives, the Court equated race with viewpoint and undermined the significance of 
other individual characteristics that contribute to diversity.”). 
138 See, e.g., Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946 (“To believe that a person’s race controls his point 
of view is to stereotype him. . . . Instead, individuals, with their own conceptions of life, 
further diversity of viewpoint.”); Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: 
The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 
425 (1998) (“[U]se of race to achieve educational diversity ‘impermissibly equat[es] race 
with thoughts and behavior’ and thereby promotes improper racial stereotyping.” (alteration 
in original) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 615 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting))). 
139 Some opponents of race-based affirmative action have argued that race-based 
affirmative action is unconstitutional because it denies the individuality of applicants, 
observing that the Court has stated that “[a]t the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of 
equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens ‘as 
individuals, not “as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.”’” 
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thought to deny applicants their individuality in this way. Class-based 
affirmative action, proponents say, treats applicants like individuals.140 
An assertion that any admissions program “treats applicants like 
individuals” requires some unpacking. Essentially, opponents of race-based 
affirmative action argue against it by claiming that the consideration of race 
denies persons their individuality, while the consideration of other 
characteristics—like test scores and grades—does not. However, an 
individual’s test scores and grades, like an individual’s race, are simply traits 
that he possesses.141 Accordingly, considering solely an applicant’s test scores 
and grades does not treat him as an individual any more than considering his 
race. Ken Simons explains this position quite clearly: “Consider a white 
employee who demonstrates that he would have received a promotion based on 
job ability if not for an affirmative action preference. He has been 
disadvantaged based on race, at least over the short-term. But considering his 
job ability and not his race would not be treating him purely as an individual. 
Job ability is a trait like any other—education, physical size, friendship with 
the boss, or race.”142 
Moreover, just as an individual’s test scores, grades, and race are simply 
traits that an applicant possesses, so is an individual’s class. Accordingly, 
considering an individual’s class does not treat him any more—or less—like an 
individual than considering his race. Thus, the consideration of race in 
admissions denies applicants their individuality to the same extent as the 
consideration of class denies applicants their individuality. And the inverse is 
also true: the consideration of race in admissions respects the individuality of 
applicants to the same extent as does the consideration of class. 
At bottom, the claim cannot be that consideration of some traits, like race, 
does not allow persons to be treated as individuals; at bottom, the claim must 
be that some traits are only illegitimately considered.143 In this way, the claim 
 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broad. Inc., 497 U.S. at 602 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)); see, e.g., Thompson & Schiff, supra note 136, at 483 (citing the 
language of Miller and arguing that “[t]he law school, therefore, falls prey to the criticism of 
the Miller and Adarand Courts”). 
140 See, e.g., Sander, supra note 131, at 664-65 (“[Socioeconomic] preferences are based 
on individual circumstances, not group membership. . . . [L]aw schools generally pay little 
attention to the ‘diversity’ contribution of individual blacks in their quest to admit blacks 
with the highest possible credentials.”). 
141 Cf. Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA 
L. REV. 447, 501 (1989) (arguing that race is one trait among many possessed by 
employees—like “education” or “physical size”—and that we should be wary of arguments 
claiming that “using one trait amounts to ‘treatment as an individual’ and using another trait 
does not”). 
142 Id. 
143 See id. (observing that when persons assert that applicants should be treated as 
individuals in the employment context, they are actually arguing that the hiring process 
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that any admissions program “treats applicants as individuals” should be read 
as an assertion that the admissions program solely considers traits that those 
making the claim deem legitimately considered. The inverse is also true: the 
claim that any admissions policy does not “treat applicants as individuals” 
should be read as an assertion that the program considers traits that those 
making the claim deem illegitimately considered. Thus, arguments that class-
based programs “treat applicants as individuals,” while race-based programs 
do not, are not arguments. Instead, they are conclusions about the desirability 
of the two programs. 
5. Unfair Burdens 
Race-based affirmative action programs are often charged with unfairly 
burdening individuals and groups of individuals in an effort to benefit other 
individuals and groups of individuals.144 Indeed, race-based programs 
“burden” individuals who are members of groups that have historically 
enjoyed racial privilege in the effort to benefit members of groups who have 
not historically enjoyed such privilege. However, the problem, opponents say, 
is that race-based programs burden individuals who, themselves, did not cause 
the disadvantage suffered by racial minorities.145 While these opponents of 
race-based programs may be willing to concede that racial minorities in this 
country have experienced disadvantages on the basis of their race, they 
conceptualize those disadvantages as having been perpetrated by individuals 
who are no longer around.146 As such, the persons who are burdened by 
programs designed to relieve racial minorities of some of their racial burdens 
are not the same persons who perpetuated the racial injury.147 The applicants 
being burdened by such programs have no direct relationship to those who 
were the architects and agents of the historical and present disadvantages 
visited upon racial minorities.148 
Simply put, the argument is that race-based affirmative action burdens 
people who, themselves, have not burdened anyone. However, this is also a 
feature of class-based affirmative action programs. When a wealthier student 
does not gain admission to an institution to which he would have been 
 
should only consider certain characteristics (e.g. job ability) to the exclusion of others (e.g. 
race)). 
144 See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (describing how the Supreme Court in 
Croson feared that race-based affirmative action unfairly burdened white people). 
145 Id.  
146 See Yin, supra note 105, at 224 (“[D]iversity [rather than remedying past societal 
discrimination] does not involve charges of past injustice and does not require children to 
pay for the sins of their parents.”). 
147 Id.  
148 Id. (“[The diversity rationale] avoids the difficulty of showing a causal relationship 
between past discrimination and today’s minorities.”). 
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admitted absent the class-conscious admissions program—that is, when the 
seat that would have been given to him is given to a poorer student—he is 
burdened even though he is not the perpetrator of the poorer student’s 
disadvantage. 
Yin makes this point by posing the hypothetical of a white student, Jason, 
who is not admitted to a school after a race-conscious admissions program 
admits a black student, Benjy, in his stead.149 Opponents of race-based 
affirmative action would argue that Jason has been wronged because, to the 
extent that Benjy has been disadvantaged on the basis of race, Jason had 
nothing to do with his disadvantage.150 Yin then changes the hypothetical into 
one in which Jason is a wealthier student and Benjy is poor.151 Should Jason be 
rejected, and Benjy admitted, pursuant to a class-based affirmative action 
program, Jason’s sense of having been wronged—inasmuch as he is being 
burdened in order to correct a disadvantage that he did not perpetrate—remains 
unchanged. Writes Yin: 
[I]f Jason loses out to Benjy, Jason would probably feel that Benjy did 
not ‘deserve’ to get in with lower scores. In this regard, Jason’s feelings 
would probably be the same whether Benjy got in because he came from 
a poor family or because he was black. . . . Jason had nothing to do with 
that race injury, but then, we might ask, what did Jason have to do with 
Benjy’s class injury?152 
6.  Undeserving Beneficiaries 
Many proponents of class-conscious programs argue that race-based 
programs benefit people who are not truly disadvantaged.153 These proponents 
claim that class-based programs will more successfully target those who are 
disadvantaged, ensuring that those who are benefitted are actually deserving in 
that regard.154 There are two responses to this argument. 
 
149 Id. at 257-58. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 257; see also Fallon, supra note 104, at 1939 (quoting a critic of class-based 
affirmative action who asked: “‘Will the man in that famous Jesse Helms commercial—
crumbling his rejection letter [that he received because a racial minority was offered 
employment pursuant to a race-based affirmative action program] in disgust—be comforted 
because he lost his job to someone else adjudged to be socio-economically preferable rather 
than racially preferable?”). 
153 See KAHLENBERG & POTTER, supra note 109, at 5 (arguing that the racial minorities 
who actually benefit from race-conscious admissions programs enjoy a large degree of class 
privilege and/or come from privileged subpopulations (such as immigrant groups)).  
154 See Yin, supra note 105, at 257 (citing RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: 
CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 178 (1996)) (delineating Kahlenberg’s position 
that class preferences benefit the actual victims of class injury in a way that race 
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First, the argument presumes that there is a homogeneity with respect to the 
disadvantage experienced by poor people such that, any time a poor person is 
benefitted by a class-conscious admissions program, the program has 
benefitted someone who has suffered the disadvantage. But this assumption of 
homogeneity is misguided. As Fallon observes, “the principal disadvantages 
associated with poverty are variable in degree. Not all poor people have 
suffered them acutely . . . .”155 Fallon suggests that given the heterogeneity 
among the poor and the variations among their experiences with poverty’s 
disadvantages, an effective class-based affirmative action program that 
addresses the injustice that is poverty would have to determine which poor 
individuals deserve to be benefitted in light of their actual experiences.156 
However, is that not the exact same inquiry that those implementing race-
based affirmative action ought to make? I, for one, have argued that there is 
much heterogeneity in the experiences that members of a racial group have 
with race; further, because race does not privilege and un-privilege members 
of races equally, then those charged with the duty of administering race-
conscious admissions programs ought to interrogate how an individual’s race 
has interacted with all the other characteristics that he or she possesses (i.e., 
sex, sexuality, skin color, class, immigration status) in order to get a sense of 
whether the individual is someone who ought to benefit from the program.157 
Which is to say: in order to be fair or effective, both class-conscious and race-
conscious admissions programs must be informed by a nuanced view of class 
and race, respectively.158 As the necessity of nuance ought not to impeach the 
 
“preferences” do not).  
155 Fallon, supra note 104, at 1939. Fallon also observes that there is heterogeneity 
among people who may not be classified as “poor,” and, consequently, many non-poor 
people may have suffered the disadvantages from which the poor are assumed to suffer. See 
id. at 1926. 
156 See id. at 1926-27 (“[N]ot all of the disadvantages associated with poverty are caused 
or constituted by poverty. Someone can be poor, even very poor, yet grow up in a 
stimulating and nurturing environment with strong support for the development of good 
character traits . . . . It is therefore an important question whether affirmative action based 
on economic disadvantage . . . should be based on economic criteria alone or whether there 
should be a further inquiry into the presence or absence of the disadvantaging conditions 
that are associated with, but not necessarily caused or constituted by, poverty.”).  
157 See Bridges, supra note 121, at 632 (“[T]he extent to which [race] has mattered for an 
individual (how much, in what ways, positively or negatively, etc.) will vary depending on 
the other characteristics that the [raced] individual possesses, such as socioeconomic status, 
immigration status, citizenship status, sexual orientation, age, gender, gender identity, and 
the region of [the] country in which the individual resides . . . . [A]dmissions officers . . . 
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legitimacy of class-based affirmative action, it ought not to impeach the 
legitimacy of race-based affirmative action. 
Second, consider Yin’s hypothetical involving a white student, Jason, who, 
due to a race-conscious admissions program, loses a seat in an institution’s 
incoming class to a minority student, Benjy.159 There is good reason to believe 
that, even if there was clear, compelling evidence that Benjy has been 
disadvantaged on account of his race, Jason and other opponents of race-based 
affirmative action would still feel as if Jason has suffered some wrong if, 
because of a race-based affirmative action program, he is rejected from the 
school to which Benjy is admitted.160 Imagine that a team of experts can prove 
that Benjy has suffered race-based disadvantages: he attended primary and 
secondary schools in a racially segregated school district;161 his schools were 
invariably majority-minority and were grossly underfunded (especially when 
compared to the schools where a majority of the students were white); he has 
been stopped and questioned by the police when driving, walking, and doing 
banal activities that normal law-abiding citizens should expect to do without 
police interrogation;162 he has been the victim of implicit bias when seeking 
employment and consequently has not been hired to do jobs that he has been 
qualified to do;163 his physical condition reflects the diminished state of health 
that racial minorities suffer in the United States in ways that are independent of 
class,164 and he is more likely to develop hypertension in adulthood.165 Even in 
 
159 See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text. 
160 See id. 
161 By “racially segregated school district,” I mean a school district where, although there 
is no evidence of de jure segregation, the racial composition of individual schools does not 
reflect the racial composition of the school district as a whole. Thus, I do not draw the 
distinction between “racially segregated” schools and “racially imbalanced” schools that 
Justice Thomas draws in his concurrence in Parents Involved. Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 749 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Racial 
imbalance is not segregation, and the mere incantation of terms like resegregation and 
remediation cannot make up the difference.”). 
162 Stop and Frisk Data, N.Y. C.L. UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-
data [http://perma.cc/PR3N-VWLZ] (providing demographic statistics of stop-and-frisk 
incidents in New York City since 2002).  
163 Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1033-34 
(2006) (“The science of implicit bias demonstrates that disparate treatment can result not 
only from the deliberate application of consciously endorsed prejudiced beliefs, but also 
from the unwitting and uncorrected influence of implicit attitudes and associations in the 
social-perception process.”). 
164 INST. OF MED., ADDRESSING RACIAL AND ETHNIC HEALTH CARE DISPARITIES: WHERE 
DO WE GO FROM HERE? 3 (2005) (“[R]acial and ethnic minorities receive lower-quality 
health care than white people—even when insurance status, income, age, and severity of 
conditions are comparable . . .  .”). 
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the face of these facts about Benjy, many opponents of race-based affirmative 
action nevertheless will imagine that an injustice has been done if, pursuant to 
a race-conscious admissions program, Jason loses “his” seat in an incoming 
class to Benjy.166 Which is to say: there is good reason to believe that the 
opposition to race-based affirmative action may not be due to opponents’ 
beliefs that such programs are imprecise insofar as they do not benefit those 
who ought to be benefitted because they have suffered race-based 
disadvantages. Instead, opposition to such programs may be due to opponents 
believing that society should not endeavor to remedy race-based 
disadvantages: such disadvantages are in the nature of “just the way things 
are.”167 Alternately, opposition to such programs may be due to opponents’ 
failure to believe that there is such a thing as race-based disadvantage. 
Accordingly, any time that racial minorities are benefitted in an effort to 
remedy this “disadvantage,” that benefit is given unjustly or undeservedly 
because the disadvantage is chimerical. 
A gloss on the argument that race-based affirmative action programs benefit 
undeserving people is the charge that, in practice, they benefit racial minorities 
with some degree of class privilege. The argument is that the programs benefit 
people who have not been disadvantaged at all.168 There are two possible 
theoretical underpinnings of this argument, both of which are problematic. The 
first theory is that racial disadvantages and class disadvantages are 
simultaneous. The second theory is that racial disadvantages are derivative of 
class disadvantages. According to both theories, if an individual has class 
privilege, then, as a matter of course, she either does not experience the effects 
of lacking race privilege or she no longer lacks race privilege.169 However, this 
 
165 David Satcher, Our Commitment to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities, 1 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 7 (2001) (“Racial and ethnic minorities tend to have 
higher rates of hypertension, develop hypertension at an earlier age, and are less likely to 
undergo treatment to control their high blood pressure. For example, from 1988 to 1994, 
35% of black males, aged twenty to seventy-four, had hypertension, while the rate in the 
general population was 25%.”). 
166 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
167 See Crenshaw, supra note 36, at 12 (hypothesizing that some people believe that the 
“current distribution of access, power, privilege, and disadvantage is just the way things 
are”). If society is not obligated in any way to remedy disadvantages on the basis of race, 
then the onus is on the individual to “pull herself up by her bootstraps.” Hence, the theory of 
“muscular self-help” embraced by Justices Thomas and Scalia. See Kendall Thomas, 
Reading Clarence Thomas, 18 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 224, 236 (2005); see also, Stephen E. 
Gottlieb, Three Justices in Search of a Character: The Moral Agendas of Justices 
O’Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 245-46 (1996). 
168 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.  
169 Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 39, at 1061. The converse is 
also true: if an individual does not have class privilege, then it may be accurate to describe 
the individual as lacking race privilege or open to experiencing the effects of lacking race 
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does not competently describe how race operates in the United States. Simply 
stated, race is not an epiphenomenon of class.170 Race is not derivative of 
class.171 Quite the contrary, race is independent of class. The scores of 
empirical studies documenting the fact that, even when controlling for class, 
racial minorities are sicker and die earlier than their counterparts with racial 
privilege function to demonstrate that race is independent of class.172 
Moreover, one ought not to deny the fact that, even when one has class 
privilege, having a phenotype that correlates with racial minority status means 
that one will have experiences that can only be described as alienating, 
injurious, disempowering, and destructive. Justice Sotomayor quite powerfully 
describes this fact in her dissent in Schuette: 
Race matters to a young man’s view of society when he spends his 
teenage years watching others tense up as he passes, no matter the 
neighborhood where he grew up. Race matters to a young woman’s sense 
of self when she states her hometown, and then is pressed, “No, where are 
you really from?”, regardless of how many generations her family has 
been in the country. Race matters to a young person addressed by a 
stranger in a foreign language, which he does not understand because 
only English was spoken at home. Race matters because of the slights, the 
snickers, the silent judgments that reinforce that most crippling of 
thoughts: “I do not belong here.”173 
Race matters when a black woman is not assumed to be the owner of the 
home in front of which she stands. Race matters when a Latina’s doctor offers 
her a long-acting contraceptive injection while this same doctor offers her 
counterpart with race privilege a simple birth control pill.174 Race matters even 
in hackneyed ways—when a black man finds it impossible to hail a cab in any 
 
privilege. 
170 If race were an epiphenomenon of class, then if we eliminated class we would 
eliminate race. This is an argument that some classical Marxists have made. See Alan D. 
Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1880, 1891 (1981) 
(reviewing DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980)). And it 
is an argument that many antiracist scholars and activists have rejected. See, e.g., Tanya K. 
Hernandez, An Exploration of the Efficacy of Class-Based Approaches to Racial Justice: 
The Cuban Context, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1161 (2000). 
171 See Hernandez, supra note 170, at 1159. 
172 See INST. OF MED., supra note 164 (discussing racial and ethnic disparities in 
healthcare).  
173 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights 
and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1676 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
174 See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS A 
SITE OF RACIALIZATION 107 (2011) (discussing the effects of race in the context of 
contraceptives). 
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major metropolitan city.175 It matters when police stop a black or Latino man 
while letting white men pass undisturbed.176 It is undeniable that class 
privilege ameliorates some of the effects that the lack of race privilege would 
otherwise produce.177 But, it should also be undeniable that even those racial 
minorities with class privilege have had the hurtful experiences described here. 
Race matters irrespective of class.178 
Racial minorities have to endure injurious, burdensome, disadvantaging 
experiences without regard to their class. Thus, when a race-based affirmative 
action program admits a racial minority with class privilege, it admits an 
individual who, invariably, has endured and will continue to endure racial 
burdens. To say that this individual is undeserving of a benefit because he has 
not been burdened on account of race is to grossly misunderstand race and to 
dangerously ignore the fact that inhabiting a raced body matters. 
*** 
I will return to the charge that race-based affirmative action programs are 
immoral—the seventh infirmity.179 In the meantime, we should acknowledge 
what the above section has endeavored to prove: class-based affirmative action 
suffers from the same infirmities from which race-based programs suffer. 
Accordingly, we should expect that class-based affirmative action would 
arouse the same antipathy that race-based affirmative action does. We should 
expect that result unless there is something specifically about benefitting 
 
175 See Dan Harris & Gitika Ahuja, Race for a Cab: When Hailing a Ride Isn’t So Black 
and White, ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/race-cab-hailing-ride-
black-white/story?id=7223511 [http://perma.cc/HQ6E-2MLQ] (discussing the problem of 
racial profiling by New York City taxi drivers). 
176 Stop and Frisk Data, supra note 162. 
177 See Bridges, supra note 121, at 631 (“[I]t may be that a black person’s class privilege 
has reduced substantially the effect that her lack of racial privilege would otherwise have 
had.”).  
178 President Obama’s remarks about George Zimmerman’s killing of Trayvon Martin 
indicate his awareness of the fact that race matters irrespective of class. President Obama 
said: “You know, when Trayvon Martin was first shot I said that this could have been my 
son. Another way of saying that is Trayvon Martin could have been me 35 years ago.” 
President Barack Obama, Remarks on Race and Trayvon Martin 1 (July 19, 2013) 
(transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/19/remarks-
president-trayvon-martin [https://perma.cc/K8YL-MAVU]). Although Obama has enjoyed 
class privilege all of his life, he is correct in noting that if a younger version of himself had 
been walking in a predominately white neighborhood—perhaps wearing a hooded 
sweatshirt, but perhaps not—someone might have perceived his race, gender, and age as 
marks of criminality and treated him accordingly. Which is to say: the construction of black 
males as criminals is not one that depends on class.  
179 See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text. 
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persons on the basis of race that raises people’s hackles. The next section 
attempts to divine what that “something” is. 
B. The Story that Class-Based Affirmative Action Tells about Race 
One of the staunchest opponents of race-conscious programs on the Bench, 
Justice Scalia, has clearly articulated his support of class-conscious programs. 
Back when he was a professor at the University of Chicago Law School, he 
wrote an article that criticized the wisdom, practicality, and constitutionality of 
race-based affirmative action.180 At the very end, however, he stated, “I 
strongly favor . . . ‘affirmative action programs’ of many types of help for the 
poor and disadvantaged.”181 
We have to ask the question: Given the infirmities that it shares with race-
based affirmative action, why is class-based affirmative action so defensible—
indeed, attractive—to those who oppose race-based affirmative action? One 
answer may be found in the statements that follow Justice Scalia’s articulation 
of support for class-based programs: “It may well be that many, or even most, 
of those benefited by such programs would be members of minority races that 
the existing [race-based] programs exclusively favor.”182 While the 
construction of the sentence draws the reader’s attention to the members of the 
minority races that are explicitly mentioned, my focus here is on those who are 
only implicitly mentioned—those “others” who stand to benefit alongside 
members of minority races, i.e., white people. That is, when persons are 
“preferred” in admissions because of their lower socioeconomic status, it is 
easy to imagine that while many, or most, of the beneficiaries will be racial 
minorities, at least some of those beneficiaries will be white. While the winners 
under race-based affirmative action programs are exclusively racial minorities, 
under class-based programs, white people can be winners, too.183 This might 
be what makes class-conscious programs appealing to some. 
If this is true, then what should we make of Justice Scalia’s declaration that 
he would support class-conscious programs even if no white people benefitted 
from them? Scalia states unequivocally that he would nevertheless support 
such programs even if “all” of the beneficiaries were people of color.184 This 
avowal suggests another possibility: the opposition to race-based affirmative 
action is due to the work that such programs do to construct society as indebted 
 
180 Scalia, supra note 110. 
181 Id. at 156. 
182 Id. 
183 Richard Cohen, a liberal columnist for the Washington Post, has expressed this very 
idea. See Steven A. Holmes, Mulling the Idea of Affirmative Action for Poor Whites, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 18, 1991, at E3 (quoting Cohen as saying: “If economic need, not race, became 
the basis for what we now call affirmative action . . . [w]hites, too, could be helped as, 
indeed, they should be.”). 
184 See Scalia, supra note 110, at 156. 
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to the racial minorities who have been objects of centuries of racially 
discriminatory treatment. 
Critical Race Theory pioneer Kimberlé Crenshaw, for one, has made the 
case that society is indebted to historically subordinated racial groups on 
account of the country’s history of subordination. In a recent article, titled The 
Court’s Denial of Racial Societal Debt, she argues that the Court’s recent 
jurisprudence—its striking down of school desegregation plans in Parents 
Involved, its gutting of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby, its continuing effort to 
construct programs that function to eliminate racial barriers as constitutionally 
suspicious in Fisher—has the overall effect of framing efforts to correct 
“historically produced social deficit” as “‘preferences’ or reverse 
discrimination,” as opposed to mechanisms for achieving restorative justice.185 
Now, it is entirely possible, and reasonable, to conceptualize this country’s 
history of racial discrimination as constructing a debt to those racial groups 
whose contributions to the country—economic, political, social, discursive—
have been devalued, have gone unrecognized, or have simply been denied. 
Indeed, it is possible to conceptualize this country’s history of racism as 
compelling state actors to acknowledge that the current marginalized status of 
racial minorities is a direct result of the debt that is owed to them. If this 
country’s history of racism has created a debt to racial minorities, then 
affirmative action programs, as a form of restorative justice, would pay this 
debt. It would do this by allowing racial minorities to gain admission to 
institutions from which they have been excluded historically—acknowledging, 
albeit belatedly, the contributions that racial minorities have made to this 
country and putting them in a position that they would have been had the debt 
never been accrued or had been repaid earlier. 
Again, race-based affirmative action programs may be understood as forms 
of restorative justice—functioning to pay the social debt that has been accrued 
to racial minorities. That being said, at least some opposition to race-based 
affirmative action is likely due to the sense that, in the twenty-first century, no 
one is indebted to anyone else on account of race. Indeed, then-Professor 
Scalia made that precise argument: “I owe no man anything, nor he me, 
because of the blood that flows in our veins. To go down that road . . . , even 
behind a banner as gleaming as restorative justice, is to make a frightening 
mistake.”186 In that way, opposition to race-conscious programs may be 
understood as arguments that there exists no racial debt. This opposition 
functions to deny the present-day relevance of this country’s appalling history; 
it functions to deny either that such history could possibly have continuing 
effects in and on the present or that society could (or should) pay this debt 
through race-conscious admissions programs. 
 
185 Crenshaw, supra note 36, at 12.  
186 Scalia, supra note 110, at 153. 
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The movement to deny the relevance of this country’s racial history—and to 
deny that a racial social debt has been accrued—was first seen in the Court’s 
refusal to find that states had a compelling interest in “remedying past societal 
discrimination.”187 Accordingly, if race-based affirmative action programs 
were to survive strict scrutiny, then they could not be justified as attempts to 
“remedy past societal discrimination.” Post-Grutter, and in the context of 
university admissions, race-conscious programs could only be justified if they 
were framed as pursuits of the educational benefits that are produced from a 
diverse student body.188 As such, the Court refused to allow race-based 
affirmative action programs to be understood as forms of racial restorative 
justice. They could only be understood as pedagogical tools that were 
uninterested in social justice at all. 
The replacement of race-based affirmative action with class-based programs 
completes the work performed by the rejection of the “remedying past societal 
discrimination” rationale and the acceptance of the “diversity” rationale. Class-
based programs elide the nation’s history of (and present) disenfranchisement 
on the basis of race. In seeking to address the injustices wrought by income 
inequality, it obscures and denies that there are continuing injustices wrought 
by race. 
Many proponents of class-based affirmative action agree with me. They 
recognize the value that race-based affirmative action has in avowing the 
enduring fact of racial inequality, and they recognize its potential to remedy 
racial injustices.189 However, they argue that race-conscious admissions 
programs are improper tools with which to address racial inequality. 
Kahlenberg writes: “Only a fool would say racial discrimination has been 
eradicated, but the appropriate remedy to racial discrimination, under our laws, 
is punishment under civil rights statutes.”190 However, Kahlenberg’s argument 
is ultimately specious. The only reason why “the appropriate remedy to racial 
discrimination, under our laws, is punishment under our civil rights statutes” is 
because Kahlenberg and other opponents of race-based affirmative action say 
so.191 One can certainly imagine a legal system that, in full recognition that 
 
187 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 548 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
188 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337-38 (2003) (approving a race-conscious 
program involving a “highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving 
serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational 
environment”). 
189 KAHLENBERG & POTTER, supra note 109, at 19 (asserting that race-based affirmative 
action may be a “way of publicly affirming that racism continues to afflict American 
society”). 
190 Id. 
191 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-06 (declaring that the state’s interest in remedying past 
societal discrimination is not a “compelling governmental interest”).  
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“only a fool would say that racial discrimination has been eradicated,” deems 
that governmental efforts to remedy this enduring racial discrimination are 
constitutionally pursued when pursued through affirmative action programs.192 
Moreover, to say that the appropriate remedy to racial discrimination is 
punishment under civil rights statutes is fairly glib in light of the fact that racial 
inequality persists despite fifty years of civil rights statutes.193 Further, one can 
just as easily say that just as civil rights statutes are supposed to remedy racial 
discrimination, anti-poverty programs—like Medicaid and Medicare, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program, Supplemental Security Income, the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, the minimum wage, and a graduated income tax—are supposed to 
remedy income inequality and poverty.194 To the extent that class-based 
affirmative action is designed to address injustices wrought by class, then one 
can similarly accuse it of being an improper tool. Proponents of class-based 
affirmative action would have to reply that class-conscious admissions 
programs remain proper tools for addressing injustices wrought by class in 
light of the fact that the anti-poverty programs that we do have in this country 
have revealed themselves to be inadequate. While these programs may have 
succeeded in providing the most basic of necessities to individuals, they are 
unsuccessful inasmuch as income inequality remains recognized as a dire issue 
of national importance195 and there is good evidence that they have done 
nothing to alleviate structural barriers to economic independence.196 Yet, one 
 
192 See id. at 558 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is too late in the day to assert seriously 
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits States . . . from enacting race-conscious remedies. 
Our cases in the areas of school desegregation, voting rights, and affirmative action have 
demonstrated time and again that race is constitutionally germane, precisely because race 
remains dismayingly relevant in American life.”). 
193 See Stephen Plass, Reinforcing Title VII with Zero Tolerance Rules, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 127, 137 (2005) (“The unrelenting challenges to impact theory highlight some of the 
indifference to discrimination and a key weakness of Title VII.”); Reginald Leamon 
Robinson, The Impact of Hobbes’s Empirical Natural Law on Title VII’s Effectiveness: A 
Hegelian Critique, 25 CONN. L. REV. 607, 609-12 (1993) (arguing that the Hobbesian theory 
underlying Title VII and the “business necessity” defense to employment practices that have 
a disparate impact on racial minorities render the statute ineffective). 
194 See Hayes Holderness, Taxing Privacy, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 11-14 
(2013) (discussing the goals of TANF, EITC, SNAP, and other public benefit programs 
within the income redistribution system). 
195 Lewis A. Friedland et al., Consuming Ourselves to Dearth: Escalating Inequality and 
Public Opinion, 644 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 280, 281 (2012) (“By almost any 
measure—income, wealth, opportunities, or comparison with other nations—the United 
States is a more stratified and unequal nation than at any time since just before the Great 
Depression in 1929.”). 
196 See Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 
WIS. L. REV. 239, 245 (discussing the long-term effects of social welfare programs and 
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can make a similar argument about race-based affirmative action. Race-
conscious admissions programs are appropriate tools for remedying racial 
discrimination because, while civil rights statutes have succeeded in punishing 
the most egregious forms of racism, they are unsuccessful inasmuch as racial 
inequality endures (as evidenced by any measure of health, income, and social 
well-being).197 Further, such statutes have done little to dismantle structural 
and institutional racism—the form that racial disenfranchisement tends to take 
in modern society given the limited, but nevertheless important, successes of 
civil rights statutes.198 
C. Just Saying: How Conservatism Tends to Explain Poverty and 
Conceptualize Income Inequality 
It bears noting that in order to justify class-based affirmative action as a 
mechanism for addressing injustices wrought by class, one must have a thick 
theory of class inequality. That is, one must believe that poverty has structural, 
not individual, causes.199 If poverty is caused by individual shortcomings, then 
it would be hard to defend class-based affirmative action programs because 
they would reward poor individuals, who are to blame for being poor, with 
admission to competitive universities. So, in order for class-based affirmative 
action to avoid being a program that benefits subordinated people who do not 
deserve to be benefitted because they are responsible for their own 
subordination, one needs to subscribe to a theory of poverty that explains it in 
terms of macro forces and not in terms of individual shortcomings. It is not 
uncontroversial to say that this is a theory of poverty that is not as widely 
accepted as progressives would hope it to be. 200 
 
recognizing that “families did not appear to be moving up the economic ladder”). 
197 See, e.g., BRIDGES, supra note 174, at 107 (discussing the considerably higher rates of 
maternal and infant mortality for black mothers and children than for their white 
counterparts); Report Sees “Sobering Statistics” on Racial Inequality, CNN (Mar. 25, 2009, 
12:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/03/25/black.america.report/ 
[http://perma.cc/A4D9-9ZS6] (citing statistics showing that blacks are “twice as likely to be 
unemployed, three times more likely to live in poverty and more than six times as likely to 
be imprisoned compared with whites”). 
198 Cheryl I. Harris, Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating Culture, 94 CAL. L. REV. 907, 
912 (2006) (reviewing MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A 
COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY (2003)). 
199 See William Julius Wilson, Why Both Social Structure and Culture Matter in a 
Holistic Analysis of Inner-City Poverty, 629 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 200, 204 
(2010) (discussing how Americans favor “individualistic explanations for poverty (e.g., lack 
of effort or ability, poor moral character, slack work skills) . . . over structural explanations 
(e.g., lack of adequate schooling, low wages, lack of jobs, etc.)”). 
200 See id. (“The Americans who answered the survey considered structural factors, such 
as ‘low wages,’ ‘failure of industry to provide enough jobs,’ and ‘racial discrimination,’ 
least important of all.”). 
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There is a substantial literature documenting that the most favored 
explanation of poverty in the United States is one that accepts individual, not 
structural, causes as the root of indigence.201 For example, Cozzarelli et al., in 
summarizing the relevant literature, write that “most of these studies find that 
Americans believe there are multiple determinants of poverty but that 
individualistic or ‘internal’ causes (e.g., lack of effort, being lazy, low in 
intelligence, being on drugs) tend to be more important than societal or 
‘external’ ones (e.g., being a victim of discrimination, low wages, being forced 
to attend bad schools).”202 
Moreover, there is a wealth of studies documenting that political 
conservatives, more so than political liberals, tend to favor explanations of 
poverty that locate its causes in individuals rather than the structures in which 
individuals exist.203 For example, Benforado and Hanson condense the 
literature into this summary: 
 
201 See Malamud, supra note 125, at 1896. 
202 Catherine Cozzarelli et al., Attitudes Toward the Poor and Attributions for Poverty, 
57 J. SOC. ISSUES 207, 209 (2001) (citations omitted); see also Adam Benforado & Jon 
Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior are 
Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 404-05 (2008) (reporting individuals making the 
following statements: “Bottom line, most people are poor because they choose to be poor;” 
and “Many poor, of all colors, are where they are because they are foolish with their money, 
integrity and philosophy.”). 
 Cozzarrelli et al. go on to say that many people believe in individualistic and structural 
explanations of poverty simultaneously. Cozzarrelli et al., supra, at 209 (citing JAMES R. 
KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY: AMERICANS’ VIEWS OF WHAT IS 
AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE (1986)). They conclude that “[t]his allows those who recognize 
that structural barriers may make overcoming poverty difficult to also believe that these 
barriers can be surmounted by sustained personal effort.” Id. 
203 See, e.g., Benforado & Hanson, supra note 202, at 383 (citing studies that 
demonstrate that “conservatives generally rate individualistic . . . causes as being more 
important than do liberals who, in turn, rate societal and fatalistic . . . causes as being more 
important than do conservatives”); Andrea Bobbio et al., Conservative Ideology, Economic 
Conservatism and Causal Attributions for Poverty and Wealth, 29 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 222, 
224 (2010) (citing studies that document that “[c]onservative voters . . . were generally more 
likely to explain wealth and poverty in individualistic terms, while left-wing individuals 
supported explanations in wide societal terms (for example, tax system, economic 
opportunities)” and that “[c]onservatives, who tend to hold people personally responsible for 
positive/negative behaviors and/or life outcomes within a free market system, make internal 
attributions or refer to dispositional characteristics of poor people”); Cozzarelli et al., supra 
note 202, at 210 (looking to studies documenting that “political conservatives were more 
likely than political liberals to make internal attributions for poverty”); William E. Griffin & 
Yaw Oheneba-Sakyi, Sociodemographic and Political Correlates of University Students’ 
Causal Attributions for Poverty, 73 PSYCHOL. REP. 795, 796 (1993) (stating that “[t]here is 
evidence which also shows that people affiliated with conservative political parties are more 
likely to choose an attribution of individual causality than those affiliated with liberal 
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[C]onservatives tend to believe that “people are poor because they are 
lazy, do not improve themselves, cannot manage money, and abuse drugs 
or alcohol. Less conservative beliefs correlate with situational 
attributions: perceiving societal causes . . . . In this view, people are poor 
because of prejudice and discrimination, inadequate education, 
exploitation by the rich, and low wages. The conservative dispositional 
attributions imply that poor people have a controllable predisposition to 
stay poor.” Relatedly, conservatives tend to be less sympathetic to and 
less willing to help individuals harmed by everything from natural 
disasters to low income, in part, because they tend to attribute the 
suffering to the victims’ faulty dispositions.204 
That a politically conservative ideology explains poverty (and wealth) in 
terms of individual, and not structural, causes may also explain why those who 
adopt this ideology do not tend to conceptualize income inequality as a 
problem—as an issue of social justice. Many conservative commentators have 
gone on the record to make the claim that the massive gap that exists between 
the wealthy and the poor in this country is unproblematic.205 As Samuel Gregg, 
 
political parties,” citing a study that “showed that political conservatives regard individual 
traits such as effort and hard work as more important than situational factors in causal 
attributions of responsibility for socioeconomic success,” and looking to more studies that 
showed that “[c]onservative voters find [individual] attributions for poverty more important, 
blame the poor for their position, and have more negative attitudes towards the poor than do 
liberal voters”). 
 Of course, the conclusion that conservatives embrace individual attributions of poverty is 
both overinclusive and underinclusive. Many self-identified conservatives favor structural 
explanations of poverty, and many self-identified liberals favor individual explanations of 
poverty. Moreover, it is possible that self-identified conservatives may embrace individual 
explanations of poverty in some instances and structural explanations in others. For 
example, in response to the images of the ravages that Hurricane Katrina visited upon the 
Gulf Coast and the fact that those who were most hauntingly affected were poor, then-
President Bush spoke about the “‘deep, persistent poverty’ that ‘all of us saw on television.’ 
According to President Bush, ‘[t]hat poverty has roots in a history of racial discrimination, 
which cut off generations from the opportunity of America.’ Viewed from a situationist 
vantage point, the impoverished seem to be victims, as opposed to causes, of their plight, 
which is perhaps why President Bush stated that ‘[w]e have a duty to confront this poverty 
with bold action.’” Benforado & Hanson, supra note 202, at 405 (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, President Discusses 
Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation (Sept. 15, 2005)).  
204 Benforado & Hanson, supra note 202, at 383-84 (quoting SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL 
BEINGS: A CORE MOTIVES APPROACH TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 98 (2004)). 
205 See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, Yes, the Wealthy Can Be Deserving, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
16, 2014, at BU6 (arguing that the very wealthy deserve their astronomical incomes, and 
suggesting that we ought not to be disturbed that some individuals accumulate massive 
amounts of wealth in a society in which extremely poor individuals also exist); Karlyn 
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conservative pundit and founder of the Acton Institute, succinctly described, 
“That certain forms of inequality exist in commercial society is a given. 
Though it is indisputable that the standard of living for everyone, including the 
poorest, continues to rise in commercial society, some people will always 
possess more wealth than others.”206 Indeed, some have claimed that not only 
is income inequality not a problem, but it is in fact desirable.207 For example, 
in response to President Obama’s recent statement that income inequality is 
 
Bowman & Everett Carll Ladd, The Nation Says NO to Class Warfare, AM. ENTER. INST. 
(May 1, 1999), http://www.aei.org/article/society-and-culture/the-nation-says-no-to-class-
warfare/ [http://perma.cc/Q4ZR-G6FH] (citing a study showing that seventy-two percent of 
persons polled “agreed that differences in social standing between people are acceptable 
because they basically reflect what people have made out of their opportunities”); Patrick J. 
Buchanan, Is Inequality a Problem—or a Power Play?, AM. CONSERVATIVE (December 31, 
2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/is-inequality-a-problem-or-a-
power-play/ [http://perma.cc/CL9J-S3U8] (“[T]here is far greater inequality in China today 
than in 1972,” but asking “[y]et is not the unequal China of today a far better place for the 
Chinese people than the Communist ant colony of Mao?” and contending that “it is freedom 
that produces inequality”); Kevin A. Hassett & Aparna Mathur, Consumption and the Myths 
of Inequality: The Standard of Living Has Increased Among All Income Groups over the 
Past Decade, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2012, 7:00 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444100404577643691927468370?
mg=reno64-wsj [http://perma.cc/RYJ3-WN6U] (responding to the charge that it is 
problematic that the rich are getting richer while the poor are getting poorer by arguing that 
“Americans have constructed a vast safety net that has adequately served the poor and 
helped them—as well as the middle class—to maintain significant consumption growth 
despite the apparent stagnation of cash incomes” and concluding that the “notion that a 
society that has accomplished such a feat is rigged or fundamentally unjust is ludicrous”); 
James Pethokoukis, Income Inequality Revisionism: Obama Rewrites the History of the 
Reagan Revolution as the Beginning of the Bad Times, AM. ENTER. INST. (Dec. 9, 2013), 
http://www.aei.org/article/economics/income-inequality-revisionism/ 
[http://perma.cc/2AC3-9F4C] (“Now both France and Japan are wealthy nations with some 
big, successful multinational corporations. . . . But would anyone say they are flourishing? 
From these examples, we can reasonably conclude that if America had rejected the Reagan 
revolution, we might well have less inequality today, but we would probably also have less 
wealth, entrepreneurship, innovation, and, when you think of it, less fun.”); see also Bobbio, 
supra note 203, at 229-31 (“[P]eople endorsing a hierarchical social system, consistent with 
their beliefs about the basic and legitimate inequality existing between social groups, were 
less likely to attribute the causes of poverty to society itself.”). 
206 Samuel Gregg, The Problem of Equality, ACTON INST. (July 17, 2007), 
http://www.acton.org/pub/commentary/2007/07/18/problem-equality 
[http://perma.cc/3MFC-VL2Z] (suggesting that the only type of equality “genuinely 
conducive to a prosperous and humane society” is “[e]quality before the law”). 
207 See Tyler Cowen, It’s Not the Inequality; It’s the Immobility, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 
2015, at BU6 (arguing against “using ‘inequality’ as an automatically negative term” and 
stating that “[a] lot of inequality is natural and indeed desirable, because individuals have 
different talents and tastes and opportunities can never be fully equalized”). 
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one of the biggest social justice issues of our time,208 one pundit responded that 
“a 2009 study by researchers Dan Andrews, Christopher Jencks, and Andrew 
Leigh . . . found that more inequality is actually associated with higher GDP 
growth. Obama mentioned lots of stats and studies in his income-inequality 
speech, but he somehow failed to cite this one.”209 
This is not to deny that structural explanations of poverty have some degree 
of salience in the United States. For example, in the early days of the campaign 
for the 2016 presidential election, potential Republican nominee Jeb Bush 
claimed that Americans needed to “work longer hours and, through their 
productivity, gain more income for their families.”210 This claim—which 
sounds like an argument that if workers are not able to support themselves and 
their families, they are not working hard enough—is consistent with 
individualist explanations of poverty. Indeed, economist and New York Times 
columnist Paul Krugman interprets Bush’s remarks as motivated by 
individualist explanations of poverty consistent with Bush’s professed 
intellectual inclinations.211 Krugman writes that Bush has expressed an affinity 
for conservative social analyst Charles Murray’s scholarship.212 Discussing 
Murray’s recent book, Coming Apart, Krugman writes that: 
[W]orking-class white families have been changing in much the same 
way that African-American families changed in the 1950s and 1960s, 
with declining rates of marriage and labor force participation. Some of us 
look at these changes and see them as consequences of an economy that 
no longer offers good jobs to ordinary workers. This happened to 
African-Americans first, as blue-collar jobs disappeared from inner cities, 
but has now become a much wider phenomenon thanks to soaring income 
inequality. Mr. Murray, however, sees the changes as the consequence of 
 
208 Jim Kuhnhenn, Obama: Income Inequality is ‘Defining Challenge of Our Time,’ 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/04/obama-
income-inequality_n_4384843.html [http://perma.cc/FS74-HK57] (citing President 
Obama’s statement that income disparity “should compel us to action” because “[w]e’re a 
better country than this”). 
209 Pethokoukis, supra note 205.  
210 Ed O’Keefe, Jeb Bush: ‘People Need to Work Longer Hours’ Means They Need Full-




211 Paul Krugman, Opinion, The Laziness Dogma, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/13/opinion/paul-krugman-the-laziness-dogma.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/8LJQ-QUNY] (“Mr. Bush’s clumsy call for longer work hours wasn’t a 
mere verbal stumble. It was, instead, an indication that he stands firmly on the right side of 
the great divide over what working American families need.”). 
212 Id. 
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a mysterious decline in traditional values, enabled by government 
programs which mean that men no longer “need to work to survive.” And 
Mr. Bush presumably shares that view.213 
Bush disputed this interpretation of his “work longer hours” remark. He 
argued that the remark was not an argument that workers who are having 
trouble supporting their families are lazy. Instead, it was an indictment of the 
lack of full-time jobs available in the labor market.214 He argued that his 
comment was a measure of his concern for the “6.5 million part-time workers 
[who] want to work full-time.”215 Thus, it seems that Bush recognized the 
political inadvisability of blatantly individualist explanations of poverty (and 
low-income), and he instead embraced structural explanations of the 
phenomena—arguing that “high, sustained economic growth” needed to 
happen in order to solve the problem of the evaporation of the livable wage.216 
Moreover, in recent years, studies that endeavor to show the precise 
structural mechanisms that produce poverty have been met with receptive ears. 
For example, economist David Autor’s scholarship documents the macro 
forces that have combined to produce poverty in the United States.217 In one 
well-cited paper, he says: 
[T]he structure of job opportunities in the United States has sharply 
polarized over the past two decades, with expanding job opportunities in 
both high-skill, high-wage occupations and low-skill, low-wage 
occupations, coupled with contracting opportunities in middle-wage, 
middle-skill white-collar and blue-collar jobs. . . . [J]ob opportunities are 
declining in both middle-skill, white-collar clerical, administrative, and 
sales occupations and in middle-skill, blue-collar production, craft, and 
operative occupations. The decline in middle-skill jobs has been 
detrimental to the earnings and labor force participation rates of workers 
 
213 Krugman, supra note 211 (discussing CHARLES A. MURRAY, COMING APART: THE 
STATE OF WHITE AMERICA, 1960-2010 (2012)). 
214 See O’Keefe, supra note 210 (quoting Jeb Bush as saying: “You can take it out of 
context all you want, but high-sustained growth means that people work 40 hours rather 
than 30 hours and that by our success, they have money, disposable income for their 
families to decide how they want to spend it rather than getting in line and being dependent 
on government.”).  




217 See, e.g., DAVID AUTOR & MELANIE WASSERMAN, THIRD WAY, WAYWARD SONS: THE 
EMERGING GENDER GAP IN LABOR MARKETS AND EDUCATION 49 (2013) (“[T]he emerging 
gender gap in educational and labor market outcomes is explained in part by changes in U.S. 
household structures, which are themselves fomented by the declining labor market 
opportunities faced by non-college males.”). 
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without a four-year college education, and differentially so for males, 
who are increasingly concentrated in low-paying service occupations.218 
Autor notes that middle-skill jobs have likely disappeared in the United 
States because they have been offshored, or because technology has made it 
unnecessary to hire workers to perform the job’s required tasks.219 He writes 
that middle-skill jobs are the type that “can be carried out successfully by 
either a computer executing a program or, alternatively, by a comparatively 
less-educated worker in a developing country who carries out the task with 
minimal discretion.”220 As such, these jobs have rapidly vanished from the 
labor market in the United States. 
The thrust of Autor’s oeuvre is that the jobs that pay wages that can support 
low- to middle-skill workers are simply not there. If these workers are poor, it 
is not because they are lazy, entitled, sexually promiscuous, or criminally 
inclined. It is because the market does not contain opportunities for them to be 
anything but poor. And, notably, Autor’s work has been well-cited by people 
and organizations on all points of the political spectrum.221 
Nevertheless, structural explanations of poverty have not deeply saturated 
the culture. In fact, a poll conducted in January 2014 by the Pew Research 
Center confirms that the majority of Americans believe that the poor are 
responsible for their poverty: sixty percent of respondents agreed with the 
proposition that “most people who want to get ahead can make it if they are 
willing to work hard.”222 Further, as documented in the studies cited above, 
those with a conservative political ideology tend to embrace individualist 
explanations of poverty and to defend income inequality.223 
So, why is it interesting that politically conservative individuals tend to 
favor individualist explanations of poverty while also rejecting conceptualizing 
income inequality as a problem? The answer: politically conservative 
 
218 DAVID AUTOR, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS/HAMILTON PROJECT, THE POLARIZATION OF 
JOB OPPORTUNITIES IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 1 (2010), 
http://economics.mit.edu/files/5554 [http://perma.cc/53SV-8VYK]. 
219 Id. at 4. 
220 Id. 
221 See, e.g., Kirk J. Stark & Eric M. Zolt, Tax Reform and the American Middle Class, 
40 PEPP. L. REV. 1209, 1213-17 (2013); Christopher Uggen & Robert Stewart, Piling On: 
Collateral Consequences and Community Supervision, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1883 (2015); 
JAMES SHERK, THE HERITAGE FOUND., CREATING OPPORTUNITY IN THE WORKPLACE (Dec. 
16, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/12/creating-opportunity-in-the-
workplace [http://perma.cc/M4DW-MA5K].  
222 PEW RESEARCH CTR., MOST SEE INEQUALITY GROWING, BUT PARTISANS DIFFER OVER 
SOLUTIONS, (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/01/23/most-see-inequality-
growing-but-partisans-differ-over-solutions [http://perma.cc/FXG7-4E68]. 
223 See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (comparing the explanations for 
poverty commonly embraced among those who self-identify as liberal and conservative). 
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individuals have been some of the loudest champions of class-based 
affirmative action. Indeed, as quoted above, Justice Scalia has stated on the 
record that he favors class-based affirmative action.224 The same is true of 
Justice Thomas.225 It is interesting, to say the least, that persons who embrace a 
political ideology that has been identified as blaming the poor for their own 
poverty support admissions programs that give preferences to those 
“blameworthy” individuals.226 It is interesting, to say the least, that persons 
 
224 See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text. 
225 Richard D. Kahlenberg, Where Sotomayor and Thomas Agree on Affirmative Action, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.: THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2013/01/17/where-sotomayor-and-thomas-agree-
on-affirmative-action/ [http://perma.cc/2Q3K-P85R] (“[B]oth justices [Thomas and 
Sotomayor] favor affirmative action for low-income and working-class students of all 
races.”). 
226 Yin notes that some supporters of class-based affirmative action argue that, while 
racial “preferences” only indirectly target those who have been injured by racism and racial 
inequality (i.e., racial classifications are overinclusive because some members of the 
benefitted class have escaped being disadvantaged on account of race), class preferences 
directly target those who have been injured by class inequality. See Yin, supra note 105, at 
257 (analyzing Kahlenberg’s argument that there is a difference between race-based 
affirmative action and class-based affirmative action inasmuch as “class preferences go to 
the actual victims of class injury”). The premise of this argument is that the poor are victims 
of class injury. However, the political ideology that many champions of class-conscious 
admissions programs embrace would argue that the poor have not been injured at all. 
Indeed, some iterations of the ideology would argue that if the poor have been injured, it is 
because they have injured themselves. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 222 
(stating that seventy-six percent of Republicans were of the opinion that “most people can 
get ahead if they are willing to work hard” (i.e., the poor injured themselves by not working 
hard)). 
 In order to resolve this apparent contradiction, one can observe that, historically, society 
has drawn a (usually racialized) distinction between the deserving poor and the underserving 
poor. See BRIDGES, supra note 174, at 213-17 (explaining the shift in demographics of those 
receiving aid from governmental assistance programs from mostly white to mostly black). 
The deserving poor are those who have been conceptualized as worthy of economic 
assistance (from the government or private charities) because they are poor due to factors 
beyond their control. Id. The undeserving poor are those who have been conceptualized as 
unworthy of economic assistance because they are poor due to their own individual 
shortcomings. Id. If class-based affirmative action is thought to benefit the deserving poor—
that is, those who are not blameworthy with respect to their poverty—then perhaps these 
programs might be understood as identifying those who actually have been injured by 
structural forces. The beneficiaries of class-based affirmative action are thought to be the 
deserving poor, who are the “actual victims of class injury.” See supra notes 153-54 and 
accompanying text. They exist in contradistinction to the undeserving poor, who are not 
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who embrace a political ideology that does not recognize as problematic the 
vast, and frequently insuperable, chasm that separates the “haves” from the 
“have-nots” in this country would also support admissions programs that 
identify income inequality as an injustice and are designed to help those 
victimized by it. There appears to be a tension. This Article suggests that the 
tension may be resolved by understanding that conservative champions of 
class-based affirmative action programs do not defend these programs because 
of the work that such programs do to help the poor and to realize economic 
justice. Instead, they support them because of the work that they do to deny 
both the legitimacy of race-based affirmative action as well as the claims that 
race-based affirmative action makes: a racial societal debt exists in this 
country, race remains a significant fact of life, race is not simply an 
epiphenomenon of class, and individuals can be racially unprivileged while 
being class privileged. 
D. The Dangers of Political Expediency, or Why Class-Based Affirmative 
Action is Immoral 
This Article has suggested that the reason why class-based affirmative 
action is so appealing to some is because it works to deny the enduring fact of 
racism and racial inequality. Now, some argue that the work that class-based 
affirmative action does to obscure and deny that there are continuing injustices 
wrought by race is actually an attractive aspect of such programs. Kahlenberg, 
for one, suggests that from the perspective of political expediency, there is 
 
 The distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor might also explain why some 
conservatives support class-based affirmative action. It is not unreasonable to understand 
class-conscious admissions programs as antipoverty programs. Danielle Holley-Walker, 
Race and Socioeconomic Diversity in American Legal Education: A Response to Richard 
Sander, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 845, 846 (2011) (“Helping low-SES people to enter higher 
education increase[s] social mobility and thus helps, however modestly, to reduce poverty 
and increase equality.”). But conservatives, historically speaking, have been highly critical 
of government-funded antipoverty programs. Kathleen A. Kost & Frank W. Munger, 
Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: 1990’s Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of 
American Values, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 3, 89 (1996). Thus, one needs to resolve the 
contradiction of why conservatives tend to oppose antipoverty programs, but support them 
when they take the form of class-based affirmative action.  
 The answer may stem from the difference between the deserving and underserving poor. 
That is, conservatives may not tend to oppose all antipoverty programs—they may just 
oppose those that are imagined to benefit the undeserving poor, i.e., single mothers and 
able-bodied adults. Id. at 6 (“Reformers have succeeded in manipulating the categorization 
of deserving and undeserving poor, claiming that the proposed reforms only target welfare 
recipients who are undeserving: idle, shiftless, and irresponsible.”). If class-based 
affirmative action is an antipoverty program imagined to benefit the deserving poor, then 
conservative support of it may not be a contradiction at all. 
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something unproductive about focusing on racism and race inequality.227 He 
argues that shifting the focus from racial injustice to class injustice will allow 
those interested in social justice to “get the job done”—that is, to right social 
wrongs—in a way that maintaining a focus on racial injustice will not. He 
contends that “replacing race preferences with class preferences will decrease 
public consciousness of race and increase public consciousness of class. For 
progressives, this shift has always been a political imperative.”228 
Kahlenberg is not correct when he argues that progressives have always 
wanted to shift the focus from race to class.229 But, more importantly, 
Kahlenberg is certainly not correct when he argues, essentially, that the ends 
justify the means. That is, political expediency ought not to excuse the elision 
of the injustices that have been visited upon racial minorities because of their 
race. And this is how one ought to respond to the accused seventh infirmity of 
race-based affirmative action, which argues that it is immoral, making it 
different from class-based affirmative action programs that arguably raise no 
moral issues.230 The reverse is true. Class-based affirmative action is immoral 
insofar as it obscures racial injustices. Indeed, race-based affirmative action 
may be the most moral effort that society could make insofar as it reminds 
society about the racial injury that racial minorities have suffered. That is, 
there is a moral value to acknowledging the exact form and content of the 
constellation of indignities, deprivations, and injuries that has functioned to 
reiterate racial minorities’ subordinate political, socioeconomic, cultural, and 
discursive status.231 Which is to say that the public ought to be conscious of 
race, racism, and racial inequality. Perhaps being unconscious of race, racism, 
 
227 See Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 39, at 1063. 
228 Id. 
229 Derrick Bell, Racial Equality: Progressives’ Passion for the Unattainable, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 495, 517 (2008) (reviewing RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
(2007)) (discussing the reasons why progressives “hold fiercely to their fervent hope that an 
approach through law will move the country toward racial justice in every important field”). 
But see SHERYLL CASHIN, PLACE, NOT RACE: A NEW VISION OF OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA 
15-18 (2014) (arguing that because conversations about race are divisive, we ought to seek 
race-neutral means of solving problems like the underrepresentation of racial minorities in 
elite institutions of higher learning). 
230 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. 
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COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORTS  (1998) (detailing the gross violations of human 
rights that individuals sustained under the system of apartheid in South Africa and 
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and received forgiveness and having made amends, let us shut the door on the past—not in 
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and racial inequality is precisely the mechanism by which they all are 
reproduced.232 Perhaps racial unconsciousness is the height of immorality. 
Moreover, if, as I have argued, race is not an epiphenomenon of class, but 
rather is an independent system through which advantages and disadvantages, 
both material and ideological, are distributed,233 then one should not assume 
that the realization of economic justice will be simultaneous to the realization 
of racial justice. This is to argue that racial minorities would remain 
unprivileged, relatively speaking, even if income inequality is addressed 
satisfactorily. This is hardly an eventuality with which those interested in 
racial justice can live. 
CONCLUSION 
Class-based affirmative action is understood, fairly, as an effort to repair the 
damage caused by this country’s history of racism and exclusion. However, it 
is quite disturbing that efforts to repair the damage caused by this country’s 
history of racism and exclusion can only be justified by not making reference 
to this country’s history of racism and exclusion. There is something deeply 
unsettling about that. More satisfying would be a jurisprudence that allows us 
to speak frankly about our dreadful history and how that history continues to 
have repercussions. Much more satisfying would be a jurisprudence that allows 
us to say, emphatically and often, that our present is dreadful in many ways, as 
well. We exist in a nation in which nonwhite people—black people, 
specifically—are poorer, sicker, more frequently incarcerated, die earlier, more 
likely to die violent deaths, etc., than their white counterparts. Given the 
intuitive injustice of those facts, we ought to develop a jurisprudence that not 
only unties the hands of any state actor who wants to remedy them, but 




232 See Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 118, at xv-xvi (arguing that 
one of the consequences of rejecting race-consciousness is that “virtually the entire range of 
everyday social practices in America—social practices developed and maintained 
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